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My War Memories
M3? War Memories
:; ;; , 1914-1918 :: , ,
6)? General Ludendorff
With 12 large Maps and 46 smaller Maps in the text
VOL. II.
O '
LONDON: HUTCHINSON & CO
:: PATERNOSTER ROW :: ::
TO THE HEROES WHO FELL BELIEVING
IN GERMANY'S GREATNESS THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
PAGE
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of il,ij . . 403
The Withdrawal to the Siegfried Line — The Reasons for Defensive Tactics in the West — The Russian Revolution — America's Declaration of War — The Battle of Arras, and the Twin Battles of the Aisne and Champagne — Battles of the Wytschaete Salient and local German Attacks — Battles in the East — Chancellor von Bethmann and Count Czernin — A Change of Chancellors and the Peace Resolution — Patriotic Instruction and Propaganda — The Questions of Lithuania, Greater Poland and Alsace-Lorraine.
Fighting in Flanders and the Collapse of Russia, Summer
and Autumn, 1917 . . . . • . . 476
Battles in Flanders, at Verdun, the Eleventh Isonzo Battle, the Oc- cupation of Riga — Preparations for the Offensive in Italy — The Third Flanders Battle — The Battle around the Laffaux Salient and Cambrai — The Campaign in Italy, 19 17 — The Macedonian and Turkish Theatres of War — The Campaign against the Baltic Islands and the Armistice in the East — Peace Questions — The Internal Condition of Germany — Reasons for the Peace Negotiations in the East.
Preparations for the 1918 Offensive in the West . . 537
The Determination to launch the Offensive — The Peace Negotia- tions at Brest-Litovsk — Bolshevism — Peace with the Ukraine and the Ultimatum to Trotsky — Conferences in Hamburg — Resumption of Hostilities in the East — The Peace of Brest-Litovsk and the Pre- liminary Peace of Buf tea — The Equipment and Training of the Troops for Attack — Support from the Allies — Our Situation as regards Supplies — The Spirit of the Army.
The Offensive in the West, 1918 589
The Plan of Attack— The Great Battle in France— The Battle of Armentieres and around Kemmel — New Plans in Contemplation — The Situation on other Fronts — The Campaign in Finland — The Battle of Soissons and Rheims and the Austro-Hungarian Offensive in Italy The Decline of the War Spirit — Our Political Policy in the East — The Offensive on the Marne and in Champagne — Foch's Counter-Attack south of Soissons.
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
The Last Phase, Summer and Autumn, 1918 . . . 679
The 8th of August and its Consequences — The Position becomes more acute — Withdrawal to the Siegfried Line — The Peace Overtures of Count Burian — Extension of the Enemy's Offensive in the West, and the Collapse of Bulgaria — G.H.Q. resolves to request an Armistice — The Introduction of the Parliamentary System into Germany — The First Note to Wilson — The Government and the request for an Armistice — President Wilson's Reply — Continuation of the Battle, the Occupation of the Hermann and Hunding-Brunhild Line — The Sitting of the War Cabinet on October 17th — The End of my Military Career.
Epilogue 765
Index 773
MAPS TO VOL. II.
IX. — The German Attack in the West, 1918 .Facing p. 590
X. — The German Retreat, 1918 . „ 678
VII. — General View of the World War . . 764
SKETCH MAPS IN THE TEXT (VOL. II.)
PAGE
15-
16. 17.
The " Alberich Movement " between Arras and Soissons,
March, 1917 406
The Battle of Arras, Spring, 1917 ..... 420 The Double Battle of the Aisne and Champagne, Spring,
■9*7
August and Sep-
22
18. — The Double Battle of the Aisne and Champagne, Spring
I9X7
19. — The Battles in the Wytschaete Salient, 1917 . 20. — The Battles in East Galicia in the Summer of 1917 . 21. — The Battle in Flanders, 1917 . 22. — The Battles at Verdun, August, 1917 23. — The Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo in tember, 1917 ....
24.— Riga, 1917
25. — The Battle at the Laffaux Salient, October
26. — Cambrai, 1917
27. — The Campaign in Italy, 1917 .
28. — Palestine ....
29. — Dago-Osel, 1917 .
30. — The Advance in the East, 1918
31. — The Great Battle in France, 1918
32. — The Battle of Armentieres and Kemmel Hill
33. — The Turkish Advance in Armenia .
34. — The Campaign in Finland, 1918
35. — The Battle of Soissons and Rheims, 1918
36. — The Battle of Noyon, June, 1918
37. — The Austrian Offensive in Italy, 1918
38. — The German attacks on the Marne and in Champagne, 1918
39. — The Defensive Battle between Soissons and Rheims, July, 1918
40. — The Defensive Battle between Soissons and Rheims, 1918
41. — The Battle between the Somme and the Oise .
42. — The Battle between the Scarpe and the Somme, 1918
43. — The Battle between the Oise and the Aisne, August, 1918 .
44. — The Evacuation of the Lys Salient, 1918.
45.— The Battles in the St. Mihiel Salient, 1918
46. — The Collapse of Bulgaria, 1918
423
425 429
433 477 480
1918
. 481
. 483
. 493
• 495 498> 499
- 504
• 507 . 565
• 597 . 605 . 621 . 627 . 631 . 633 . 635
644
669
673 681 691
693
697
709 713
PREFACE
During the four years of fighting I was unable to keep any record of events. I had not the time. Now that I have more leisure, I pro- pose to repair this omission by writing my experiences during the Great War, drawing chiefly upon my memory for the narrative.
It has been my destiny to hold various high appointments. Upon Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and myself, in conjunction with other men, devolved the task of conducting the defence of the Fatherland.
In these pages I propose to give an account of those deeds of the German people and their Army with which my name will for all time be associated. I shall tell of my strivings and of all that I lived through in this struggle of the nations — how the German people fought as men have never fought before, how they endured, and how their efforts were gradually paralysed.
Germany has not yet had time for introspection and heart-searching. She is too heavily weighed down. And yet she can take heart from the magnificent deeds of her Army, and from all they, too, accom- plished who worked at home. But if she wishes to learn anything from the succession of events which culminated in her undoing, she has no time to lose, for the world's history strides ruthlessly on, and tramples under foot those nations who tear themselves to pieces by internal conflict.
LUDENDORFF.
Written at Hessleholmsgard, in Sweden, between November, 1918, and February, 191 9 ; completed in Berlin by the 23rd of June, the day on which we accepted (!) the Peace.
MY WAR MEMORIES,
19144918.
THE ENTENTE ATTACK, JANUARY- JUNE, 1917
I
AS far as human judgment could foresee everything pointed to the Western Front as the scene of our chief defensive fighting in 19 17, however severe the struggle might be in the East. Direct co-operation with the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. was not so necessary as it had been during the campaign against Rumania, after the command on the Eastern Front had been reorganized in a less complicated form. The supreme import- ance of the Western theatre of war now demanded the presence there of the Commander-in-Chief. I suggested Spa or Kreuz- nach as the new headquarters. Spa was rejected ; Kreuznach was particularly favourable, as many of the cables to the Front passed near the town, and it had suitable hotel and other ac- commodation. Orders were accordingly given for General Headquarters to be established at Kreuznach, Miinster am Stein and Bingen, and the second fortnight of February was contemplated as the time when the transfer should take place. Meanwhile, the possibility of having to return to Pless had to be kept in view.
The Austro-Hungarian Headquarters was transferred to Baden, near Vienna.
vol. 11. 403 1
My War Memories, 1914-1918
The submarine-cruiser campaign opened on February ist, 1917, and as soon as it became evident that the troops that had been concentrated on the frontiers of Holland and Denmark, to meet a possible attack from these quarters, would not be required, these forces and their staffs, which had been held in reserve for the purpose, were liberated for use on the Western Front.
In the West a continuation of the British attack on the Somme, perhaps extending to the north, had to be reckoned with. It was possible that this would be accompanied by a French offen- sive between Roye and Noyon, but the probabilities were that France would choose our Soissons-Rheims-Argonne front for attack, as she had done in the autumn of 1915. The Entente would thus have gained a strategic advantage by pressing in both flanks of the salient we had pushed into French territory. It was impossible to foresee which part of the front the French would select. They might try a diversion at Roye, and reports also pointed to the possibility of an offensive on the Lorraine front and in the Sundgau, where we had made very little progress towards the consolidation of our lines. We had always been conscious of a certain weakness in this sector, as local engagements were to be expected here, and it was only with difficulty that we could bring up reinforcements. Verdun was also occasionally mentioned, as the French were always in a position to open an attack at this point. Lastly, an extension of the British offensive towards the north was indicated. Con- sequently we had to be prepared to offer a stubborn resistance at any point along our whole front. It was impossible to tell what was going to happen.
There was no doubt about the continuation of the struggle on the Izonzo front. Trieste was Italy's goal. Attacks were more than likely in Macedonia and on the Vardar, and certain in Turkey, Palestine and Bagdad.
In the East I anticipated an attack on the Austro-Hungarian troops in the southern section of the front. A sudden Russian advance in the direction of Mitau at the end of January alarmed both ourselves and the Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern
404
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
Front. It was, however, stemmed by reserves, which were rapidly brought up.
It was not yet possible to foresee when the great offensive would take place. On the Eastern Front it was scarcely to be expected before April. The big Russian advance in the spring of 1916 began in March, and was considerably hampered by the bad weather and the condition of the ground. It was unlikely that the Russians would repeat this attempt so early in the year. It was also possible that the Entente would accordingly post- pone their offensive in the West. The situation on the Somme, however, was so tense that we had to be prepared for an earlier attack.
The general situation made it necessary for us to postpone the struggle in the West as long as possible, in order to allow the submarine campaign time to produce decisive results. Tactical reasons and a shortage of ammunition provided addi- tional reasons for delay. At the same time it was necessary to shorten our front in order to secure a more favourable grouping of our forces and create larger reserves. In France and Belgium we had 154 divisions facing 190 divisions, some of which were considerably stronger than ours. In view of our extensive front, this was an exceedingly unfavourable balance of forces. More- over, we had on certain sectors of our line to endeavour to avoid heavy enemy attacks as long as possible, by preventing our adversaries from concentrating strong forces in front of them. At the same time we secured positions in which weaker divisions, wearied by fighting, could be employed.
These considerations, taken in close connection with the opening of the submarine campaign, led to the decision to straighten our front by withdrawing to the Siegfried line, which was to be in a state of defence by the beginning of March, and methodically to carry out the work of demolition over an area of 15 kilometres in breadth in front of our new position.
Under the rubric " Alberich " the Army Group of the Crown Prince Rupprecht had worked out a programme for the work of clearance and demolition, which was to be spread over five vol. 11. 405 1*
My War Memories, 1914-1918
weeks. If an attack on the part of the enemy made it neces- sary we could at any moment interrupt this programme and begin our retreat. Our first object was to avoid a battle, our second to effect the salvage of all our raw material of war
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German line at beginning of March, 1917.
German line at the end of March, 1917, after the Alberich Movement.
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Fig. 15 The
Alberich Movement " between Arras and Soissons, March, 1917.
and technical and other equipment that was not actually built into the position, and finally the destruction of all high roads, Tillages, towns and wells, so as to prevent the enemy establishing himself in force in the near future in front of our new position. Poisoning of the wells was forbidden.
406
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
The decision to retreat was not reached without a painful struggle. It implied a confession of weakness bound to raise the moral of the enemy and lower our own. But as it was necessary for military reasons, we had no choice ; it had to be carried out. General von Kuhl and I were in constant com- munication on the subject. The Field-Marshal and the Kaiser gave their consent. On February 4th the order was given to carry out M Alberich " according to plan. The first Alberich day was February 9th. The retreat was to begin on March 16th, but under enemy pressure might start at any earlier date. This would, however, have involved great loss of material, not to mention the partial abandonment of the work of demolition. At the same time Lieut. -Colonel Nicolai received instructions to mislead the enemy by furnishing them with special news. He and Colonel von Haeften had so to influence the home and neutral Press that no inkling of the intentions above described should be given. I myself personally informed the Chancellor of our scheme.
The Alberich programme was carried out according to plan. It was successful in every detail. Many treasures of art were removed from the zone we were evacuating, and in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention stored in places of safety in the occupied territory. The fact that much property belonging to the inhabitants was destroyed was to be deplored, but it could not be helped. The bulk of the population was transferred eastward, only a small proportion being collected in certain places, such as Noyon, Ham and Nesle, and provided with rations for several days and left behind. On the one hand it was desirable not to make a present to the enemy of too much fresh strength in the form of recruits and labourers, and on the other we wanted to foist on him as many mouths to feed as possible.
On the Somme front fighting with the British had never quite come to a standstill. At the beginning of March signs were not wanting that the battle north of the Somme might break out afresh. South of Roye, too, French preparations for attack became ever more conspicuous. Whether the attitude of
407
My War Memories, 1914-1918
both armies was the outcome of the measures we had taken it is impossible to say. It was a severe strain on the nerves of the local commanders to keep, in spite of everything, to the date originally fixed upon for the retreat to begin. In the event this did not prove entirely practicable, as in the north from about the nth, and in the south from about the 13th, minor modifications of the line were effected in order to evade the attack, which seemed every day more and more imminent.
The great retreat began on March 16th, according to plan, and was carried through without a break in a few great stages. The object of G.H.Q. was in general to avoid battle, and to allow the troops time to prepare the Siegfried line before the enemy reached it in superior force. Some of the divisions in reserve at the time were ordered to the new position, in other places divisions had to remain at their places in the front line.
Only south of St. Quentin was the enemy to be attacked after crossing the Somme and the Crozat canal ; this was done, but the attack was not carried out with sufficient energy. Its success was not conspicuous. The Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group and we at G.H.Q. had weighed the possibility of a general counter-attack along the whole of the Siegfried line, for we should have liked to wipe out our confession of weakness by a great tactical success. The condition and numbers of our troops, however, were such that it was impossible for us to throw in sufficient forces to guarantee a real victory on a battle- field rendered impassable, and G.H.Q. had, therefore, for better or worse, to give up the idea of a great counter-attack.
The Entente armies followed closely on the heels of our retiring forces and tried to make out that our retreat was a great success for themselves. But the Press had been so cleverly and effec- tively manipulated that they did not succeed. As a matter of fact they had not gained any military triumph. Thanks also to the false intelligence we had circulated, they had not even interfered with our work of demolition and clearance. The whole movement was a brilliant achievement on the part of both commanders and troops, and is evidence of the careful foresight and work of the German General Staff.
408
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
We were now more compactly and firmly established than we had been along our previous extended line. The tactical measures of the enemy had been frustrated. He was no longer able to attack in the same directions as before. The country we had traversed was devastated, and before military operations could be made possible upon it a certain amount of restoration was essential. For an attack to be launched over it an infinite amount of road and bridge building would have to be done- The enemy, therefore, established himself in relatively low strength in front of our new line. We, for our part, could now thin out our forces by taking away whole divisions.
We had completely achieved the objects we had had in view in carrying out the Alberich programme, and occupying the Sieg- fried line. It stood us in good stead for some considerable time. The retreat had been well worth while. Indeed, all our com- manders wished that the German Army had possessed many another Siegfried line, with its concrete dug-outs, for the conduct of the war during 1918 would then have been easier. The labour required for their construction, however, was not available. More- over, the best lines ultimately gave way before the tanks, which were able to overcome the greatest obstacles.
We had to put up with the fact that the Entente turned our exceedingly thorough demolition of the territory and dispersal of the population to account, in order once more to call us Huns, and to play the organ of their propaganda with all the stops pulled out. One cannot blame them. Nevertheless, we had acted in accordance with the laws of warfare, and had not even gone as far as the belligerents in the American Civil War.
During our retreat in Poland in 1914 we had spared the country as far as possible, for there, on account of the vast distances, I had set all my hopes on the destruction of the rail- ways. But in the present case the area evacuated was so small that the country had to be more severely handled. In Poland we were able to leave the inhabitants of enemy territory alone ; here both humanity and prudence demanded that we should remove them. Ought we to have left them to perish in the devastated districts ? In all the measures we took, the exigencies
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
of war alone proved the decisive factor. Otherwise the dic- tates of humanity were obeyed as far as possible. We were too great to wish to increase the suffering of others by un- justifiable harshness and spite. This was the case not only here, but everywhere. We only acted with severity where military security demanded it — in matters of contre-espionage for instance.
II
In considering the strategic value of our retreat, I counted on the British offensive developing to the north at the end of March. It was impossible to foretell with certainty where .t would take place. An attack near Arras seemed likely.
In the middle of February, 1917, in order to improve its position, the Third Army had undertaken a local operation on the Champagne battle-fields of September, 1915. This operation was successful. Amongst the captured material there was found an order of the 2nd French Infantry Division, dated January 29th, clearly pointing to a great French offensive on the Aisne for April. This gave us an extremely important clue. Little attention was now paid to rumours of attacks in Lorraine and the Sundgau.
Thanks to their ample labour supply, the Entente had been in a position to furnish, not only the Verdun sector, but also a large portion of their front with all the means of communica- tion and munitions necessary for an attack. It was, there- fore, possible for them in the shortest space of time, and at various parts of the front, to develop an offensive without betraying their plans by their preparations. The photographs of the enemy's field defences and works, and the continual checking and verification by new photographs secured by our aviators, could therefore only give general indications of his intended movements.
The French front between Vailly on the Aisne and the Argonne was particularly well constructed, so that special preparations for attack were not necessary. We saw the works that were
410
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
actually built south of the Chemin des Dames when we advanced in 1918. Their construction seems to have dated from 1915-16. It is possible that the French had intended to make an offensive here in 191 6, but were prevented by the German onslaught on Verdun.
Conditions on the Western Front had become more secure, but the depression due to the battles on the Somme and at Verdun still weighed down the minds of our people, and increased the nerve-racking tension inseparable from the defensive. The organization of the commands had been improved. Crown Prince Rupprecht's command included the 4th, 6th, 1st and 2nd Armies, between the channel and La Fere. Next to this was the German Crown Prince's command, with the 7th, 3rd and 5th Armies, which extended almost as far as the Orne, east of Verdun. Then came the group of Field-Marshal Duke Albrecht of Wurtemberg — who had handed over the 4th Army to General Sixt von Arnim — -Army detachments C, A., B., whose Chief of Staff was General Kraft von Dellmensingen. Thanks to the establishment of this Army Group, conditions on the Alsace-Lorraine front were very considerably improved.
The shortening of the line between Arras and Laon made it possible to release the Headquarters Staff of the 1st Army. It was transferred to the group of armies under the German Crown Prince, on either side of Rheims, between the 7th and 3rd Armies. Such a transfer and readjustment of an army command is a troublesome undertaking, on account of the changes it entails in the lines of communications. It cannot be done in a day if serious friction is to be avoided.
I hoped that this Staff would be fixed up, with head-quarters in Rethel, before the French attack on the group of armies under the German Crown Prince was opened. The troops had had two extra months for rest and training, as a result of the successful carrying out of the Alberich programme. They had certainly gained considerably in strength, but in the group of armies under the Crown Prince Rupprecht there were still some divisions that required rest.
Training was suspended. Some of the new formations were
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
already being employed in quiet sectors of the line, others were only just fit for use as reinforcements. Divisions from Rumania had arrived in Belgium. G.H.Q. had also exchanged divisions unfit for the Western Front for good righting forces from the East, although this necessarily involved a weakening of our defences there. The consolidation of the front was pushed on. The labour which had been liberated by the occu- pation of the Siegfried line was employed behind those sectors where attack was anticipated, and the completion of the support and rearward trenches had to be accelerated. The supply of ammunition had improved, the increase being due chiefly to the diminished consumption during several months. A reserve had been created, which gave a certain security as long as the battles east and west did not last too long. The Hindenburg programme gradually began to show results, and the further supply of ammunition was assured.
On the Italian Front all was quiet. In Macedonia local attacks by the Entente in February and March at Monastir and in the bend of the Cerna were repulsed with heavy loss. In Turkey's Asiatic theatre fighting had begun again with the fine weather. The British had finished their preparations and opened an offensive. In Palestine the British attacks on Gaza failed, thanks to the efforts of Colonel von Kresz. In Mesopotamia it soon became evident that the Turkish Army in Irak had lost all power of resistance. Kut el Amara fell on February 25th, and by March nth Bagdad was occupied by the British, a severe blow for Turkey, which was thereby forced to evacuate the Persian frontier district. In consequence of these events Enver approached G.H.Q. with the request that a German Army Group Headquarters with a German auxiliary corps might be put at his disposal for the recapture of Bagdad. This undertaking involved months of preparation. The organization of the lines of communication had to be complete before the troops arrived. The completion of the Amanus tunnel for standard gauge traffic in January, 1917, and that of the narrow gauge line through the Taurus tunnel, to be opened in the autumn, improved com- munications in Asia Minor. Enver's projected enterprise seemed
412
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
practicable. There was a likelihood of bringing strong Turkish forces into action again, supported by a few German battalions, which would compel the British to increase their effectives in Irak.
G.H.Q. agreed to Enver's request, though not exactly with enthusiasm, and at his desire General von Falkenhayn was given command of the group of armies. The Ministry of War began the formation of the weak Asiatic Corps.
In the East vast changes had taken place. In March the Tsar was overthrown by the Revolution, which was favoured by the Entente. A Government of pronounced Socialist leanings came into power. The Entente's reasons for backing the Revolution are not clear. They may have imagined they were confronted by a national movement which they could not ignore, and with which they consequently threw in their lot, or they may have thought that the Tsar had become inclined for peace, owing to fear of an internal collapse, and were therefore in favour of getting rid of him. Possibly there were other reasons. At all events, it is cer- tain that the Entente expected the Revolution to bring them some advantage in the war. They wished at least to save anything that could be saved, and consequently did not hesitate to act. The Tsar, who had begun the war in order to please the Entente, had to be removed, This line of conduct revealed infinite will-power, which would stick at nothing in order to win the war. The same thing would have happened if Sturmer had really favoured peace in 1916.
The outbreak of the Revolution threw a strong side-light on conditions in Russia. The army and nation were rotten to the core, or it would never have taken place. In Russia, as with us, the army was part of the nation ; there, too, nation and army were one. How often had I not hoped for a revolution in Russia in order that our military burden might be alleviated ! But my desire had been merely a castle in the air. Now it had come true, and as a surprise. I felt as though a weight had been removed from my chest. At that time I never contemplated the possi- bility that it might undermine our own position later on.
It was impossible to tell to what extent the position in the East
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
would be relieved, and for the moment attacks had to be expected. Nevertheless the Revolution was a serious blow for the Entente, as it inevitably entailed a diminution of Russia's fighting capacity and brought considerable relief to us in the extremely difficult position in which we were placed. For G.H.Q. this consisted first of all in the saving of troops and munitions in the East ; and the exchange of worn-out divisions from the West for fresh troops from the East was undertaken on a large scale.
Orders were given for propaganda to be set on foot at once to encourage a strong movement for peace in the Russian Army.
The outbreak of the Russian Revolution was a factor in the war upon which no general could dare to count with certainty. Now at last it was no longer a hope, but a reality with which I could deal as a soldier. Our general position had considerably improved, and I could look forward with confidence to the battles in the West. The results of the submarine campaign were distinctly favourable, and far exceeded the expectations of the Navy. The loss of tonnage and material sunk was bound to tell. The Economist of September 7th, 1918, calls the spring of 1917 the most critical and perilous period through which England had passed since the outbreak of war. The Entente found itself forced to employ for naval warfare men and material hitherto destined for the conflict on land, and this continued in an ever- increasing degree.
The United States declared war on us on April 5th. The collapse of Russia, the success of our submarine campaign and the desire to use their forces to combat the U boats, must have been factors in their decision. On February 3rd America had broken off diplomatic relations with us, and I doubt whether it would have been possible to come to terms with her in the mean- time without disturbing the basis upon which the submarine campaign was being conducted. The attempt on the part of our Foreign Office to establish military relations with Mexico strength- ened public opinion against us in the United States. In spite of my warnings the Foreign Office had used an antiquated and easily decipherable secret code.
Soon after America's declaration of war the whole world was
414
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
ranged against us, only a few States, including the Argentine and Chile, preserving their neutrality in face of enemy pressure. The American declaration of war included all the States of the Quad- ruple Alliance, with the exception of Bulgaria, where the Ameri- can representative continued to hold his post at Sofia. The German Government failed to secure his recall through the Bul- garian Government, although I requested them several times to do so. This failure brought heavy retribution upon us later on.
It was not a matter of surprise to me that the United States joined the ranks of our enemies. I had reckoned upon her doing so, provided the balance of war continued in our favour, even if the unrestricted submarine campaign had never been opened. As far back as the spring of 1915 an American correspondent on the Eastern Front had expressed views to this effect, and they certainly did not reflect his own personal opinion alone. America had never known Germany in time of peace, and she now viewed us and all the events taking place in Europe through the glasses of Entente propaganda, strengthened by her ties of blood with England. The German American population had little influence. To appeal to their loyalty to the country of their birth, as against the country of their adoption, as we did for a time, was clumsy and bound to produce an unfavourable effect. I have not been able to get a clear account of the attitude of the Irish section of the population. The oppression of this unfortunate country left the United States cold.
Wilson's reply to the Kaiser's letter of the autumn of 1914, in which the latter appealed to America's sense of justice with regard to the Belgian atrocities, gave food for thought. America was led by economic interests ever more and more to the side of the Entente, for England had surrendered to her the position she had hitherto enjoyed as the first capitalist Power in the world. The Entente was deeply in America's debt, and their defeat would have involved her in heavy loss.
The attitude of the United States in regard to the question of the supply of munitions left no doubt about their one-sided conception of neutrality. England's monstrous violations of
4i5
My War Memories, 1914-1918
international law at sea were only possible so long as America connived at them. In a conversation at the Foreign Office several years before the war I was assured that America would never agree to such tactics. We reckoned with certainty on unlimited imports through Holland.
As a matter of fact the American Government did actually raise objections to the arbitrary methods of English naval warfare. The American note of protest of March 30th, 1915, was couched in serious language. It asserted in unequivocal terms that the so- called British blockade was " an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace," and continued with the warning that to tolerate England's procedure in this respect would be to assume " an attitude of unneutrality to the present enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this [the U.S.A.] Government in the present circumstances." This declaration was perfectly plain. A second American Note of November 5th, 1915, emphasized the fact that the so-called blockade of March nth of the same year must be considered ineffective, and therefore illegal. Both protests were bluntly rejected by England. The United States Government accepted the rebuff. According to her own verdict her attitude to Germany for nearly two years was unneutral.
The opinion of the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, on these proceedings is contained in a memorandum to the Government and people of the United States, published in the Times of April 13th, 1915. It runs as follows : u If the American people desire to observe true neutrality, they will find the means to stop the exclusive export of arms to one side, or, at least, use this export trade as a means to uphold legitimate trade with Germany, especially trade in foodstuffs."
From one-sided favouritism to open partisanship was but a small step. I will mention only two instances : Mr. Choate, the late American Ambassador in London, wrote on April 7th, 1917, to Earl Grey : "As you know, I have thought from the beginning that while for the time being we might better serve the cause of the Allies by remaining neutral and supplying all that
416
The Entente Offensive in the Firstplalf of 1917
we could in the way of arms and munitions, and, I am happy to say, some men, as our neutral right was ; that nevertheless, when by entering into the war with all our might and with the aid of all our boundless resources, we could help to bring it to an end in the right way by the complete suppression of Prussian militarism and the triumph of civilization, it would be our duty to do so. That time has now come." And on June 3rd the American Admiral Sims spoke as follows in London : "In 1910, when our Fleet visited England, I made a small but very un- diplomatic speech. ... In that speech I expressed an opinion which is now being translated into action. . . . This is what I said : ' In my opinion, if the time ever comes when the integrity of the British Empire is seriously threatened by a European coalition, you may count on every ship, every dollar, every man and every drop of blood of your kinsmen across the sea.' "
Very characteristic of the views of American official circles is the following conversation, which took place between a certain reliable personage and an American Consul-General, and it is in complete harmony with the opinions given above. Asked whether the Lusitania affair had really led to American intervention, the Consul-General replied : " No, that was only the match that set fire to the straw, and it has been fully exploited as propaganda. But for this we should have had to find other convincing reasons for coming into this business ! If we had not joined the Allies we should have been nowhere after the war. Now we expect to be number one — and we shall be number one I" To the question as to what part America would play as number one, he replied : " Germany was undoubtedly the most industrious country in Europe before the war. We in America and England saw to what an exalted height Germany was climbing, and realized that in a few decades she would reach the pinnacle of power and be in a position to dictate, not only to Europe, but to the whole world. She had become a menace and we in America recognized the fact. For this reason we tackled the problem and thought we under- stood it. We are convinced that our people will take the lead after the war. It is we who are going to dictate, not only to Germany, but to the whole of Europe. The nations will expect
417
My War Memories, 1914-1918
great things from us, above all, peace. And they will get it, but on our conditions, and at our price ! "
" Will America impose her will on her Allies ? " " Yes, indeed she will ! But they will get better conditions than other countries (the Central Powers), just as we (America) shall get better conditions from them (the Allies). It is all a matter of business. That is what war has always been ! "
The American consul's prediction regarding his country's position after the war was ill-founded, though only because the Revolution rendered Germany defenceless and gave world domi- nation to Great Britain. For America could no longer count upon any opposition to England in Europe. However that may be, the war was certainly no matter of business for Germany. It was forced upon us. Our economic future and independence were bound up in it ; to us it was a question of life or death.
I will not discuss how far the above opinions coincided with those of President Wilson and the majority of the American people. All that need be said is that they became supreme. Under the pretext of the submarine campaign America entered the war against us at a period critical for the Entente. Whether, without the excuse afforded by the U boats, she would have done so in time to prevent our winning the war in 1918 is open to doubt. But it is impossible to say how events on land would have turned out if the submarine campaign had never been opened.
As a matter of fact, on January 9th, 1917, no one could have foretold the collapse of Russia, and nobody calculated upon it. With the help of our submarines we reckoned on a decision in our favour, at the latest before America, with her new armies, could intervene in the war. Without the U boats we calculated that the Quadruple Alliance must be defeated in 1917. As it was, the history of this year took a completely different turn : the Western Front held firm, but the submarine campaign brought no decision and Russia collapsed.
On the Eastern Front we were in a condition of neither peace nor war. A solution then became possible of which no one could have dreamt before the autumn of 1917 : namely, to aim at a decision of the war on land in the year 1918 by means of an
418
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
offensive, which must succeed if the submarines had by that time been able at least to reduce enemy tonnage to such an extent as to render the quick transport of the new American armies impossible, or even to sink only a certain proportion of the transports. The Navy counted upon being able to do this.
Ill
G.H.Q. began to reckon on the great Entente offensive in France, Macedonia and on the Isonzo for the middle of April. From Kreuznach, whither we had moved at the end of February, I had often visited the Western Front, and had discussed the situation with the Headquarters Staffs of the Groups and Armies as well as with the Staffs of the corps in the most dangerous positions. We had exchanged views on tactics. The Army Groups of the Crown Prince Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince were strengthened with divisions, artillery and ammuni- tion, and were provided with everything necessary for successful defence. Where help was desired I gave it to the best of my ability.
The 6th Army wanted to make a rectification of its line by means of a local advance at Souchez between Lens and Arras, and prepared to carry it out at the beginning of April. On the 6th of April I had no doubt that a great British offensive was imminent at Arras. The operation at Souchez was abandoned. I begged the Group Headquarters to bring up their reserves nearer to the line in the area of the 6th Army. The last attacks at Verdun in October and December had confirmed the old adage that the right place for reserves is close to the firing-line. The " Defensive Battle " manual laid down that, in many places on the front under attack, counter-attack divisions should be held in readiness in the second line to meet and throw back the enemy if he broke through the first line.
The divisions which constituted the second and third waves were indeed moved up by the 6th Army, but on the 8th were vol. ii. 419 2
My War Memories, 1914-1918
not close enough up. On the 9th, after a short but extraordi- narily intense artillery preparation, our army encountered a powerful attack, led by tanks, on both sides of the Scarpe. Some
lrnes\
uquieres / ftkuajnes/Pm ^MdrrfignyenfoMk
Wy-Hontignym g^pnin-UefajxJ
'eaumont
]rocout
Bernard^
Quwy isUoffe
Mercatp{ \
REFERENCE German line at open- ing of British at- tack on 9/4/17.
German line on May 17.
Rear position.
>tcou$f$!ton 1=300000
T.f | f f T f r u u*
Approx. 7 miles. Fig. 16. The Battle of Arras. Spring, 1917.
of our advanced divisions gave way. The neighbouring divisions which stood firm suffered heavy losses. The enemy succeeded before noon in reaching our battery positions and seizing heights
420
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
which dominated the country far to the east. The counter- attacking divisions were not there to throw the enemy back, only portions of the troops could be brought up by motor transport. The situation was extremely critical, and might have had far-reaching and serious consequences if the enemy had pushed further forward. But the British contented themselves with their great success and did not continue the attack, at least not on April 9th.
On that day I celebrated my birthday at Kreuznach. I had looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence, and was now deeply depressed. Was this to be the result of all our care and trouble during the past half-year ? Had our prin- ciples of defensive tactics proved false, and if so what was to be done ? I was not at that time able to get a clear view of all the details of the battle. I sent for officers who had taken part in the conflict in the front line, and by means of conversations with them and telephonic communications gained the impression that the principles laid down by G.H.Q. were sound. But the whole art of leadership lies in applying them correctly. Moreover, a divi- sion had failed here which had previously enjoyed a high reputa- tion. The battle of Arras on April 9th was a bad beginning for the decisive struggle of this year.
April 10th and the following days were critical. The conse- quences of a break through of 12 to 15 kilometres wide and 6 or more kilometres deep are not easy to meet. In view of the heavy losses in men, guns and ammunition resulting from such a break through, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage. It was the business of G.H.Q. to provide reserves on a large scale. But it was absolutely impossible, with the troops at our disposal and in view of the military situation, to have a second division immediately behind every division that might possibly fall out. A day like April 9th threw all calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a new line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the crisis, even if the troops were available, depended very largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the enemy, after his first victory would attack again, and by further success aggravate the difficulty of vol. 11. 421 2*
My War Memories, 1914-1918
forming a new line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were to be won only too easily.
The British attacked again at the same spot from the ioth onwards in great strength, but not really on a grand scale. They extended their offensive on both sides, especially to the south, as far as Bullecourt. On the nth they took Monchy, and during the following night we evacuated Vimy ridge. April 23rd and 28th and May 3rd were again days of severe fighting, and in the intervals sharp local engagements took place. The battles con- tinued ; we launched minor counter-attacks, which were success- ful, but also suffered slight losses of ground here and there.
The Army Commander of the 6th Army, General von Fal- kenhausen, whose Chief of Staff was Colonel von Loszberg, was very energetic in organizing the defence of the new position, and was supported in his efforts by the Staffs of the Groups and G.H.Q. A further withdrawal to the Wot an position, which was still under construction, was not found to be necessary, though contemplated for a time by the 6th Army.
The battle of Arras was at its height in the second half of April, and was swallowing up a liberal supply of reserves and material, when, on April 16th, the French also opened their formidable offensives on the Aisne and in Champagne. No doubt exceedingly important strategic objects lay behind the British attack, but I have never been able to discover what they were. I took for granted, in spite of the restricted area of their onslaught, that a great break through was planned, and not merely a battle of attrition and diversion. But possibly the British Army had not quite recovered from the battle of the Somme and had undertaken a diversion here whilst the French Army was to gain a decision.
The ultimate strategic object of General Nivelle was to break through the German line between Vailly and Rheims in the first few days. Following on this a push east of Rheims as far as Suippe, was to widen the breach and shatter our front for 70 kilometres ! The decisive blow was to be struck by the French Army against the group of armies under the German Crown Prince. The pressure from Arras eastwards on Douai and the
422
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
a,
CO
423
My War Memories, 1914-1918
break through on both sides of Rheims via Rethel in the direction of Mezieres was to envelop the Siegfried position, the construc- tion of which had been surveyed by hosts of aeroplanes. The Entente intended to make our whole front reel as far as the sea.
The preparations for defence were carried out with extra- ordinary care by the German Crown Prince's Army Group and the 7th and 3rd Armies. The Crown Prince and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Count Schulenburg, were indefatigable. The command of the 7th Army was in the hands of General von Boehn, one of the best generals in the German Army, a Prussian officer of the old school, a good trainer of troops and a man of untiring energy. His Chief of Staff, Colonel Reinhardt, was a clever man, whose careful work made him a useful complement to his commanding officer. General von Einem, who was in command of the 3rd Army, is well known as Minister of War, an able and far-sighted officer who knew the army well and under- stood the psychology of the troops. His Chief of Staff, Colonel, later General, von Oldershausen, was a man of irrepressible vitality and loved his work; he too was the right complement to his superior. The Headquarters Staff of the 3rd Army was afterwards eliminated for the battle. In the first fortnight of April the Headquarters Staff of the 1st Army took over the command under General Fritz von Below. He had as his assistant Lieut.-Colonel von Kliiber, who had gained valuable experience in the battle of the Somme, and, like his general, was a particularly sound judge of tactics. He was afterwards murdered at Halle by Sparticists in the discharge of his duties !
At first the troops would not believe in the possibility of an offensive, as they had seen no preparations for it. But gradually they nerved themselves to face the severe fighting that lay before them.
After several days' artillery preparation the French attacked early on April 16th between Vailly and Brimont, to the north- west of Rheims. They broke through at various points on the Chemin des Dames and forced us to withdraw with heavy losses from the Vailly salient to the heights of the Chemin des Dames. Further to the east the French clung firmly to the ridge that to
424
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
the north falls sharply into the Ailette valley. Between the Winterberg and the Aisne the French pressed forward with tanks to the outskirts of Juvincourt, but were here held up by a counter- attack division. Due east of the Aisne our troops held their ground. Towards Brimont another break through was made, but was neutralized by a push on the part of our counter-attack forces. On April 17th and 18th the enemy renewed the assault, but was unable to gain any advantage.
Meanwhile offensives in Champagne had also been opened, directed against the heights of Moronvilliers. One division gave way, and we lost the heights which formed a key position.
REFERENCE rmm
ummmm German line before
1614/17. ■■ritaB^ French attacks.
wmtmtm German line at con- clusion of the battle.
Fig. 18. The Double Battle of the Aisne and Champagne. Spring, 1 91 7.
When the French attempted to descend the northern slope they were exposed to our artillery fire, which mowed them down and brought them to a standstill. Our counter-attack divisions, as I subsequently ascertained in personal conversation with the regimental commanders, were thrown in too hastily, so that on the 19th we failed to recapture the heights. The loss of them was a severe blow, as they afforded a view, to the north, right over the whole country ; but we had to make the best of it. The crisis of the April battle had been survived. In these battles the French infantry had attacked in close formation, and its losses had been appalling. Both on the Aisne and in Champagne General Nivelle again attempted to score a victory. By this time
425
My War Memories, 1914-1918
our line was once more re-established and consolidated, so that on both fields of this great double battle the new offensive came to grief with heavy loss.
The 7th May saw fierce fighting all along the front, after which the attack on the Aisne died down, and after the 9th it waned in Champagne also, though it blazed up again at this point on the 20th. The French offensive had collapsed with terrible loss of life, and although France was obliged to celebrate it as a victory it caused great depression. The Minister of War admitted in July that the attack had failed with losses that must not be incurred again. These losses were so great that the moral of the army began to suffer and mutinies broke out, though we heard but little about them, and that only by degrees. Only later on did we learn the whole truth.
Changes were also made in the French High Command. General Nivelle was replaced by General Petain. Both had made their reputation at Verdun, General Petain by his defence in the spring and summer of 1916, General Nivelle by his offensive of October to December. The tactics which had succeeded then were expected to lead the French Army to final victory in the spring of 1917.
Thanks to the measures we had taken for defence and the resistance of the German Crown Prince's Army Group, this pro- mised victory was turned into a defeat. By superhuman efforts we gained a great success and showed ourselves superior to the enemy in training. Our losses in men and material were extra- ordinarily high. It was impossible to foresee what turn the conflict might take and what claims we might have to meet.
In spite of the seriousness of our position on the Western Front, the absence of any Russian attacks in the spring of 1917 prevented a general crisis in our situation such as we had experienced in September, 1916. I had never been one to indulge in fruitless speculation, but I could not help considering what our position must inevitably have been had the Russians attacked in April and May and met with even minor successes. We should then, as in the autumn of 1916, have had a desperate struggle. Our supply of munitions would have been diminished to an alarming
426
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
extent. If the Russian successes of July had occurred in April and May I do not see, as I look back, how G.H.Q. could have mastered the situation. During these two months of 1917, in spite of our Aisne-Champagne victory, it was the Russian Revolution alone that saved us from serious trouble.
The Russian offensive took place later on, in July, two months after the Anglo-French attack. This was not a joint blow such as we had had to meet in the autumn of 1 916. It was a question of two disconnected attacks, and operating, as we did, from interior lines, we were able to repel and overcome our separate opponents one by one.
On the Italian Front, too, there was violent fighting in May. The tenth battle of the Isonzo once more closed without victory for the Italian Army. In Macedonia an enemy offensive on a large scale collapsed before the Bulgarian lines. The submarine campaign again achieved good results in April and May and relieved our Western Front.
IV
After their great failure in April and May and the collapse of Russia in the interval, England and France saw themselves faced with a new situation. They decided on a second great offensive, with the object of winning the war before the end of 1917. At the same time they wished to secure guarantees that final victory might be assured, at any rate by 19 18. The chief weight of the blow was directed against Ypres, with a view to capturing the German submarine bases in Flanders. The trans- port of the new American troops to France in 1918 had to be safeguarded by a war against our U boats.
For the moment the French Army remained inactive, in order to recuperate after its recent defeat. Later on it confined itself only to local engagements, although these were of considerable intensity. The main forces of the British and Belgian Armies, supported by French troops, were held in readiness for the attack
427
My War Memories, 1914-1918
in Flanders. Fresh offensives were also to be opened on the Isonzo, in Macedonia and Palestine.
In the summer of 1917 I was naturally unable to form such a clear idea of the intentions and measures the enemy were then maturing as I did in the previous July and August.
A weakening in the French attacks was perceptible in the second half of May, and the French Army continued to be com- paratively inactive. Meanwhile I had to reckon on a resump- tion of their offensive, which was possible at any moment, either here or at some other point. The British Army con- tinued fighting on the old battle-field east of Arras in the second half of May, not, indeed, with the vigour displayed in the Somme battles, but still pursuing its tactics of attrition.
At the beginning of June increased activity on the part of the enemy was noticeable in the neighbourhood of our salient at Wytschaete, south of Ypres. The straightening of this salient really ushered in the great Flanders battle in June. As long as it remained in German hands every British attack at Ypres and to the north of that town was outflanked from the south. The tactical position of the German troops in the Wytschaete salient was by no means favourable. There were some thoughts of evacuating it and withdrawing to the chord position. The Army, however, was of opinion that it could be held. Repulsed attacks are always to the advantage of the defending side, owing to the immensely heavy losses they entail for the enemy. The Group Headquarters and G.H.Q. therefore agreed that the salient should be held. We should have succeeded in retaining the position but for the exceptionally powerful mines used by the British, which paved the way for their attack, consisting, as usual, of fierce artillery fire supporting a closely massed infantry advance. The result of these successful mining operations was that the enemy broke through on June 7th.
The heights of Wytschaete and Messines had been the site of active mine warfare in the early days of the war. For a long time past, however, both sides had ceased to use such tactics ; all had been quiet, and no sound of underground work on the part of the enemy could be heard at our listening posts. The
428
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
mines must, therefore, have been in position long before. The moral effect of the explosions was simply staggering ; at several points our troops fell back before the onslaught of the enemy infantry. Powerful artillery fire raining down on the Wyt- schaete salient hindered effective intervention by our reserves and the recovery of the position. The line following the chord of the arc was then taken up with our consent. I refused to
REFERENCE
German line before 7/6/17.
German line PloPoTtPPPt after 7/6/17. nvWSP'
Ml r tote
1*200000 *M T. m mi— JLmm
10km
Fig. 19. The Battles in the Wytschaete Salient, 191 7.
countenance any suggestion of further withdrawals. The 7th of June cost us dear, and owing to the success of the enemy attack the drain on our reserves was very heavy. Here, too, it was many days before the front was again secure. The British Army did not press its advantage ; apparently it only intended to improve its position for the launching of the great Flanders offensive. It thereupon resumed operations on the old Arras battle-
429
My War Memories, 1914-1918
field, and also between La Bassee and Lens. The object of the enemy was to wear us down and distract our attention from Ypres.
The command of the 6th Army had been changed. General von Falkenhausen had taken the place of the late General von Bissing as Governor-General of Belgium. He was a particularly striking personality who, on taking up his new position, retained our complete confidence. The 6th Army had been given to General Otto von Below who relinquished the command of the Army Group in Macedonia to General von Scholz, who had latterly commanded an army on the Eastern Front.
The end of the Aisne-Champagne battle had left the 7th and 1st Armies on a very unfavourable line, particularly at many points along the Chemin des Dames. To give up the ridge would have meant a French success and would have had a de- pressing effect on the troops who had held it so bravely. The group of armies under the German Crown Prince and the 7th Army wished to secure improved positions by a series of minor engagements, so as to establish a line suitable for a permanent position. This plan coincided with the views of G.H.Q. As the result of various actions, prepared with the greatest care by the Staffs which took part in them, and skilfully carried out by the forces engaged, a moie favourable line was gradually secured here and fresh life was put into the troops.
General von Gallwitz, too, the Commander of the 5th Army* wished for the same reason to undertake a local improvement of position on the west bank of the Meuse, which the Army Group there considered particularly important. The German Crown Prince's Group supported the proposal and G.H.Q. gave its consent. The attacks on the 18th and 19th of June succeeded. But here again we realized, as we had done before, that to attack is easier than to hold what has been won.
In all these engagements, undertaken by the 7th and 5th Armies in order to improve their position, the possibility of enemy counter- attacks was reckoned with and their repulse provided for, in the estimates for men and ammunition furnished to G.H.Q. We wished to avoid anything in the way of a wild gamble. Although
430
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
everything was done to meet these enemy counter-attacks they succeeded far too often. The 7th Army had been equal to them. Before Verdun the French deprived us of the greater part of our gains. I was glad when the battles there came to an end, and sorry that I had ever allowed the attacks to be made. I was as little in favour, as when Chief of Staff on the Eastern Front, of continuous battering tactics in which the gain does not counterbalance the loss.
On the front of the 4th Army the British had been established ever since 1914 in a narrow bridgehead close to the coast on the right bank of the Yser. This point had always been the Naval Corps' weak spot. The 4th Army, which was supported by this Corps, received permission to take this bridgehead. The attack took place on July 10th, and was successful. The Yser effectively prevented all enemy counter-attacks.
In spite of the severe fighting for the Wytschaete salient in the first half of June and other engagements on the British front, the activity in the West from the middle of May till June was such that some of the troops at least were able to recuperate, and we were in a position to form reserves. The Western Army was well prepared when events in the East came to a head.
Events turned out as we had expected ; the Russian Revolu- tion had weakened the enemy's fighting strength. The wish for peace seemed to be gaining ground in Russia, but the attitude of the new Russian Government and of the Russian people and Army towards this question was not uniform. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miliukoff, pressed for the continuation of the war and the recasting of the map of Europe at the expense of the Quadruple Alliance. Other ministers talked about a peace without annexations or indemnities and the right of nations to self-determination. But they were all unanimous in demand- ing adherence to the alliance with the Entente Powers, and we had to reckon with their deliberate efforts to quell any desire
43i
My War Memories, 1914-1918
for peace in Russia. There was not the faintest ground for expecting any relaxation of their desire to annihilate us.
The attitude of the Russian troops was in some places friendly, and we gladly met them half-way. On other parts of the front active fighting continued, but we kept as quiet as we could. In April and May, and right on into June, the general military posi- tion was not such as to encourage us to activity on the Eastern Front. The Government were also afraid that an attack on our part might check the disintegration of Russia. At the beginning of April events there were developing very rapidly. Linsingen's Army Group carried out a local attack on a bridge- head on the Stochod, north-east of Kovel, which had survived the righting of 1916. This was in itself an unimportant opera- tion, but the number of prisoners we took was so large that even I was astonished. The Imperial Chancellor approached me with the request to make as little as possible of this success, and I did as he asked, though extremely unwillingly. The troops who had carried out the attack did not deserve to be passed over in silence. In the Press our reserve about the Stochod battle gave rise to a certain amount of criticism. I understood that, but considered it my duty to accede to the Chancellor's request, in order not to disturb in any way the prospects of peace which at this moment really were looming into view G.H.Q. forbade any further demonstrations of force.
When Kerensky came on the scenes in May the great danger of the Russian Army being reorganized increased. England, France and the United States spared no effort to achieve this object. In view of this, frequent discussions took place at G.H.Q. as to whether a rapid attack on the Eastern Front with troops that the Commander-in-Chief there had on the spot, strengthened by a few divisions from the West, would not be better policy than continuing to play the part of inactive spectators ; for now was the moment to level a blow at the Russian Army, while its fighting powers were reduced. I did not agree with that policy, although the position in the West had improved. I was unwilling to do anything which, even in appearance, might injure a real prospect of peace. From a
432
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
REFERENCE
Allied line at beginning of Russian offensive on 1l7H7.
Russian attacks.
German counter-attack on 1917/17.
Allied line on
2517117.
Allied line at the beginning of August, 1917.
Approx. 70 ruiles. Fig. 20. The Battles in East Galicia in the Summer of 1917.
433
My War Memories, 1914-1918
military point of view, too, this line of conduct was justified, because every revolution undermines and disintegrates the fighting strength of an army. Anyhow, I was still wondering whether this would happen, when on July ist the first Russian attack took place in Galicia. The time of tedious waiting in the East was over and G.H.Q. no longer had their hands tied, but were given full freedom of action.
The Russian offensive was planned on a large scale. The attack was to be made from the Riga bridgehead, at Dvinsk, Lake Narotch, at and south of Smorgon, and in the whole of Galicia, from the Tarnapol-Zborow-Lemberg railway as far as the Carpathians. The centre of gravity of the whole operation lay here in the south. The Commander-in-Chief in the East was not unaware by the end of June of the projected offensive. Numerous deserters had kept him well informed and he took all the necessary defensive measures. To carry out the counter- attack he had planned he needed reinforcements from the West. It is true that for the moment things were quieter there, but it had to be assumed that fighting would continue. Nevertheless, whatever might happen there, G.H.Q. were bound to exploit the opportunity offered in the East. In order, if it were by any means possible, to deal with Russia once and for all, and so gain a free hand on one side, six divisions were set free for the East. More was not possible at the moment, and it was only very unwillingly that the army commanders on the Western Front gave up the divisions for the other front. They were unable to grasp the magnitude of the undertaking.
Next to a crossing of the Dvina above Riga, the most favourable point of attack on the Eastern Front, was the Zborow — valley of the Sereth line in East Galicia. From here an attempt might be made to envelop the southern portion of the Russian Army, and it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to put this plan into action at once. G.H.Q. was able to give its consent. How the attack would turn out, and whether it was to be regarded as a major operation, as I secretly hoped, or merely as a tactical counter-attack, and how the Russian and also the Austrian
434
The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
armies would fight, remained questions the solution of which I awaited with the keenest anxiety.
The Russian attack in East Galicia was made in dense masses with a vast expenditure of ammunition. It succeeded against Austrian troops, but not against German and Turkish. On July 1st strong Russian forces broke through the Austro-Hun- garian line between Zborow and Brzezany. Austrian troops deserted to the enemy in large numbers. On July 2nd the C.-in-C. in the East had to throw in substantial reserves to ease the pressure. Further Russian attacks collapsed. The offen- sive against the southern army began on July 4th. The fierce struggle lasted for several days, and ended with a complete success for the defence of General Count von Bothmer's army, which consisted almost exclusively of German troops.
South of the Dniester the Russian attack against the Austrian 3rd Army on July 6th and 7th was completely successful. The Austrian troops gave way ; a German division which had but recently arrived tried to stem the retreat, but was carried along by it. The Russians pressed forward to the Lomnitza and occupied Kalusch. The position was critical for the Com- mander-in-Chief. He had collected his reserves for the intended counter-attack between Zborow and the Sereth, in the direction of Tarnopol, and the Western divisions were being moved to this area. Just as in the previous year the Archduke Charles's front had to be strengthened before we could concentrate against Rumania, so now the C.-in-C. in the East had to stiffen the Austrian troops, and especially the 3rd Army, before he could carry out his preparations for the counter-attack. He is the more to be congratulated inasmuch as, in spite of the retreat south of the Dniester and the violent attacks which now began in the north, he made his thrust north of Zborow and carried through the operation without a hitch.
At Kalusch luck favoured us. The Russian Army had already paid too dearly for its early keenness in attack and had made no further progress on the Lomnitza. The first German troops to arrive were consequently able, thanks in part to the energetic intervention of Major Freiherr von dem Busche, of my staff, vol. 11. 435 3
My War Memories, 1914-1918
to hold the position. On July 15th they succeeded in gaining ground, and the crisis was overcome.
The most violent of the attacks on the C.-in-C. in the East's old front took place on July 21st and the following days at Krevo, south of Smorgon ; here the Russians broke through a division of the Landwehr occupying a very long front, though it defended itself with extraordinary courage.
For a few days things looked extremely serious, until our reserves and artillery fire restored the situation. The Russians evacuated our trenches. They were no longer what they had been.
Meanwhile our count ei -attack group had finished their con- centration between Zborow and the Sereth. Unfortunately the attack had to be postponed two or three days, until July 19th, on account of extremely bad weather. This was the day on which the peace resolution was debated in the German Reichstag. The attack was a brilliant success ; ground was gained over an area twenty kilometres in breadth and fifteen kilometres in depth. The whole army was in high spirits. In the Reichstag this victory for German arms was described as a stimulant.
The next day the thrust was continued in the direction of Tar- nopol, which fell on July 25th, and the Russians began to with- draw from before our positions south of the Zborow-Tarnopol railway. The tactical counter-attack developed into an opera- tion on a grand scale. The disorganization of the Russian front extended further and further to the south. The southern army, the Austrian 3rd and 7th Armies, which had a specially strong stiffening of German troops, moved up. The whole of the Eastern Front as far as the Bukovina was now in motion. The Russian Army retired in disorder ; the Revolution had broken its back- bone.
On August 2nd and 3rd we succeeded by steady fighting in reaching the Zbrucz, and took Czernowitz and Kimpolung. This was the utmost to which we could effectively develop the counter-attack of the 19th of July. It is true that for a time I hoped that the Austrian 3rd and 7th Armies would press forward into Moldavia, but the Austrian powers of attack were not equal
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to the task, and the Germans alone were not strong enough. Communications turned out to be so difficult that the proper supply of the armies could not be managed until the railways had been repaired. Large bodies of men were set to work at this, but the destruction was so thorough that weeks elapsed before we could think of extending operations to the south of the Dniester.
The German troops, as in the previous autumn, had done splendidly in this open fighting ; they felt relieved from the terrible grip of trench warfare. But the Austrian Army, in spite of all the care lavished on it, showed a diminution of fighting power which was in the highest degree alarming.
On the Zbrucz the struggle swayed backwards and for- wards for a few days longer ; south of Czernowitz the group of armies under the Archduke Joseph, who had taken over the chief command in Hungary from the Emperor Charles, pressed a little bit further eastward ; but although battles had begun on the Rumanian front, the major operation was over.
Here, in the mountains between Focsani and the frontier, a Russo-Rumanian offensive had opened on July 24th to relieve pressure elsewhere. It chanced to strike a weak spot in our line and won a local success.
Our advance north of the Carpathians, down from the Dniester and through the Bukovina towards Moldavia, suggested the idea of resuming operations against the Rumanian troops and an attack on the lower Sereth, whilst the Austrian armies continued their march past and south of Czernowitz. Various considerations led us to send the Alpine Corps to Rumania in July and still further weaken the Western Front. This attack was still under contemplation when the Russo-Rumanian thrust mentioned above took pace. It was arranged that Mackensen's Army Group was to make an advance northwards on the west bank of the Sereth, and the southern group of armies, under the Archduke Joseph, from the Oitoz Pass towards Ocna. The battles began in the first half of August and lasted into the second half. They scored local successes in both places, and forced the enemy to surrender the ground won on July 31st.
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Thanks to the influence of the French the Rumanian Army had become so much stronger that strategic successes seemed out of the question for us as long as the offensive in Bukovina remained at a standstill. For the present it was impossible to continue it. The attacks of the Army Groups under Mackensen and the Archduke Joseph were held up. The Rumanians, in their turn, now made unsuccessful attacks. Gradually the fighting died down here also.
The great Entente offensive to which we were to succumb in the early summer of 19 17 had petered out ; owing to the Russian Revolution there had been no concerted action. When *he Anglo-French-Italian advance was made Russia fell out, and when Russia took the offensive the Western Front had weakened. We had held out, though we had suffered heavily, and on the Eastern Front we had won a notable success. The military collapse of Russia was patent to the whole world.
Six months of the submarine campaign had gone by. It had accomplished much ; judging by mere numbers more, but in its final result less, than had been anticipated. I still hoped that the expectations of the Navy would be realized in the near future, But I began to wonder whether as many U boats as possible were really being built. It was imperative that every effort should be made to increase the effect of the submarine campaign. It is true that, in view of the anxious military and economic situation, G.H.Q. was not in a position to transfer skilled workmen to any great extent from the army to the navy, or to curtail the Hindenburg programme for the sake of the latter.
VI
Hard work and an unflinching determination, helped by the Russian Revolution, had enabled us to relieve the military situation. But meanwhile, as had already been the case in Austria-Hungary, the disintegration of the moral resolution of the
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German people, under pressure of this upheaval and of economic privations, combined with the growing influence of enemy pro- paganda, was to bring about events which steadily lowered the fighting strength of both the allied States and jeopardized our military gains. From this time onwards the hope of the Entente for the internal collapse of their enemies was continually fed. Peace was to be made immeasurably more difficult, and the end of the war postponed.
Chancellor von Bethmann and Count Czernin were both com- pletely obsessed by the influence of the Russian Revolution. They both feared a similar catastrophe in their own countries, and thought of nothing but possibilities of peace, which had unfortunately receded into the dim distance, whereas until peace had been attained they should have taken energetic measures to prosecute the war. They ought to have raised the moral of the nation by creative activity, just as G.H.Q. had succeeded in improving the army's fighting strength in a desperate struggle against a powerful adversary. As it was, their policy led to perpetual concessions at home, and they gave up the task of leading the nation. The whole tendency of their ideas made them overlook the unspeakable harm they were doing to the strength of their respective countries, which ought to have shown a united front to the enemy, and they did not realize how they were prejudicing the conduct of the war; Neither of these men, whom destiny had placed at the head of their people at this terrible crisis, possessed the strong character that events demanded. No doubt they had to face serious internal difficulties. Count Czernin, with his conglomerate Empire, had an infinitely complex task. The problems pre- sented to Herr von Bethmann were probably easier ; he had only to act in accordance with the conclusions that could be drawn with overwhelming force from the nature of the war and from our position in face of a foe determined to destroy us. Instead of harping ever more and more on the idea of a peace of reconciliation, which was always out of the question, he ought to have knitted the nation together and pointed out to it the great tasks before it and the objects to be attained, and then
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have given us in the army a free hand. The German people ought to have been shown again and again what they were fighting for, and what the enemy in his heart of hearts really wanted. The majority would then have followed him as they had done in 1914. There are always some who can never be taught. Was there really any room for doubt regarding the ideas and objects of our enemies, as interpreted in the light of their whole history and their whole mentality, not to mention their answer to our peace offer of December 12th and to Wilson's Note of December 18th ? Could anyone fail to realize that the weakening of the war spirit at home must cripple the conduct of the war ?
How seriously the position was regarded by G.H.Q. the deci- sion for the submarine campaign and the retreat to the Siegfried line had shown drastically and clearly enough, even to the lay mind. It must have been obvious to the Government that earnest and thoroughly conscientious effort alone could pull us through.
At the beginning of April, 1917, the Kaiser received the Em- peror Charles at Homburg. The latter was accompanied by Count Czernin and General von Arz. The Chancellor, the Field- Marshal and I were also summoned.
Herr von Bethmann and Count Czernin had already met. On March 27th these gentlemen had come to an agreement, recorded in the " Vienna Document " of that date. It comprised a minimum peace programme, based on the status quo ante, and a programme for bringing the war to a favourable conclusion on the lines I had advocated. No mention was made of any renunciation whatever.
This important document was first known to the Secretaries of State and G.H.Q. on February 5th, 1918.
While kings and councillors were discussing affairs at Hom- burg, General von Arz, the Field-Marshal and I held a consulta- tion on the situation. We had occupied the Siegfried line and were expecting the great April offensives. I considered the British attack imminent. The result of the submarine cam- paign in March had been good and the Ministry of the Interior
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began to build high hopes upon it. The importance of America was given due weight. Our verdict on the situation was grave but confident ; we hoped to repulse the Entente attacks in the near future, but for the rest had to await the results of the sub- marine campaign and the development of events in Russia.
General von Arz had similar hopes for the Austro-Hungarian Front, but added that in consequence of lack of raw materials and of the heavy demands on man power, the Austro-Hun- garian Army could only fight on until the winter. There was no difference of opinion as to the necessity for prosecuting the war for the present with the utmost energy. It was impossible to foresee how events might have developed by the winter.
About midday there was a consultation between the German Imperial Chancellor, Count Czernin, the Field-Marshal, General von Arz and myself. The Chancellor asked me before the dis- cussion began whether I thought the time had come to make a move for peace. I could only answer that the Entente were about to make an immense effort and that I did not think the moment favourable from the military point of view. The question was not further discussed, even in connection with the Russian Revolution. Count Czernin proposed that in order to obtain an early peace we should give Alsace-Lorraine to France. Austria-Hungary was to hand over Galicia to Poland and support a union of Poland and Germany. At this moment our meeting with the two statesmen, which had lasted about ten minutes, was interrupted. The Chancellor and Count Czernin were summoned to the two Emperors. This ended the official part of the Imperial meeting as far as I was concerned. In the afternoon I was received by the Emperor Charles.
After lunch Count Czernin explained his views to me in a private conversation. He based his wish for peace upon the internal condition of the Dual Monarchy. I had no reason to conceal my personal opinion. After all, I was the son of my Fatherland and had a perfect right to say what I thought. I told Count Czernin that he ought to lead the peoples of the Dual Monarchy more firmly and raise their moral. He replied that this was impossible. I then turned to his proposals. His
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Polish project seemed to me very dubious. What would Poland's attitude towards it be ? What effect would it have on our eastern provinces ? I was all the more astonished at this whole scheme, as Austro-Hungarian policy in Warsaw showed no signs of honest concern about German interests. The Polish project was quite indefinite ; the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France, however, presented a perfectly clear issue, of which, in my opinion, there could be no question as long as we were not beaten. Every nation stands or falls by its honour. All German parties — even the Independent Socialists — were united in regarding Alsace-Lorraine as German, and in considering it a point of honour for us to fight to the utmost in defence of this possession. Any Government, or even the General Staff, which failed to recognize this would have been rightly swept away by indignant public opinion. Our situation was certainly serious, but we were still capable of putting up a stiff fight ; we only needed the will to do so. The surrender of Alsace-Lorraine would have been an open confession of weakness and certainly condemned as such even by peace-lovers. At. that time there was no need for such a sacrifice. It might confidently be expected that the Entente would see nothing in all these proposals but a trap or a confession of military defeat that would make them raise their demands considerably.
Count Czernin could give no definite answer to my inquiry as to whether the Entente would really be satisfied with the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.
He expressed views of the gravest kind on Germany's internal conditions. He must have been in possession of excellent information. This closed our interview.
Count Czernin did not again mention the separation of Galicia from the Austrian Empire, though he continued for some time to urge that Rumania should be included in Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence, and the East, including Poland, in that of Germany. These were broad and clear generalizations with which G.H.Q. could only agree. They were recorded in the Kreuznach Agreement of May 17th and 18th.
Soon afterwards, however, Count Czernin supported the Austro-
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Polish solution with great energy and skill, and thus revealed the real character of his country. For Austria to renounce Poland would have produced disastrous effects in the Monarchy. The prestige of the young Emperor was also at stake. It was obviously Count Czernin's intention to oust us from Poland as well as from Rumania. The Austro-Polish solution entailed grave dangers for Prussia and Germany. The Field-Marshal and I feared that it meant the break-up of the Alliance, and was a direct threat to our eastern provinces. The Poles would always pursue their claims to German territory, and the Prussian Poles would play into their hands. The Vienna Government would find itself forced to become the agent of their wishes. As long as these views were advanced by an isolated Poland Germany could deal with them, but if a Slav Austria stood behind them the whole matter assumed a different aspect. Germany's vital interests would be seriously threatened, conflict would arise between the two Empires, and would find Germany in an extra- ordinarily difficult position, both from the military and political point of view. The province of Silesia would have been encircled and our communications with East Prussia, Lithuania and Courland threatened. The annexation of these two districts was at that time by no means a fantastic dream. Neither did I see how, from the economic point of view, Germany could reconcile herself to the Austro-Polish solution, which in Poland itself was bound to entail the gravest difficulties and to cut us off from the Russian market. We knew from experience what an obstacle Austiia-Hungary presented as a route for our trade to the Balkans. The question was often to be discussed by us in the future, and the verdict passed upon it by the German Government to undergo strange transformations.
Austria-Hungary was constantly discussing the early con- clusion of peace. Thus, about the middle of April, the Emperor Charles, in a letter addressed to His Majesty, dealt with the possibility of having to make great sacrifices in order to obtain it. The dangers of an international revolution were described in great detail, and the urgent need for such a peace deduced from it. These and similar letters were handed by His Majesty
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to the Imperial Chancellor to answer. The Field-Marshal and I had to comment upon them from the military point of view, and the Chief of the Naval Staff from the naval. Of course we said, as in duty bound, what we thought was right ; how our comments were made use of was the business of the Imperial Chancellor. In this instance his ideas coincided with ours and with those of the Chief of the Naval Staff.
Early in May the Chancellor replied to the effect that, con- sidering the great hopes the Entente had at the moment, both of the success of their offensive and of the re-establishment of Russia, our efforts would be doomed to absolute failure if we made our readiness for peace too obvious. It would merely make the Central Powers appear hopelessly exhausted and thereby make the enemy intensify his efforts. At the moment peace was only obtainable by submitting to the will of our enemies, but that kind of peace the people would neither understand nor permit.
Conditions in Russia had so far developed favourably for us. In that country the demand for peace was becoming more and more insistent. Our difficult task was to follow the process of development and disintegration in Russia with the closest atten- tion, hasten it if we could, and deal with any approaches from that quarter in such a way that actual peace negotiations might follow. Possibly such negotiations might then become the pre- lude of a general peace.
This constituted the official reply to the Emperor Charles' letter.
On many other occasions Count Czernin pressed for peace. He continued to advocate the surrender of German territory to France, but he was never able to say whether the Entente was inclined for peace, or whether any tangible method of attaining it had presented itself. Count Czernin would surely have told us if he had discovered it.
In his speech of the nth December, 1918, he discussed the questions of war and peace at great length ; presumably merely in order to show that he had seen disaster coming. That is an unproductive occupation.
Pessimists are always clever people. When the evil day arrives
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
they are gaped at for their wisdom. The mob offers them in- cense— and to itself at the same time. The mob has always anticipated disaster. If it does not come, the pessimists and the mob are more satisfied than ever. So they both enjoy themselves, anyhow. Men of action are not so fortunate ; they are only right when they are successful. Then the mob cheers them. But if they are not successful, or worse, meet with disaster, the same mob stones them. Pessimists and the mob do not ask what they themselves, or the men of action, have done to avert disaster. The mob lacks judgment and cannot be expected to ask.
But I am surprised to find Count Czernin behaving in the same way. Has he really fairly told himself and the world what he actually did, in the situation in which he found himself, to avoid losing the war and so save his own and his Allies' countries from disaster and shame ?
Unfortunately Count Czernin omitted to inform us earlier of those facts which did not come to my knowledge until I read his speech. He said : " On several occasions our representatives got into touch with those of the Entente, but unfortunately these feelers never got to the stage of concrete proposals. We fre- quently had the impression that we should be able to make a separate peace without Germany, but we were never informed of the definite conditions on which Germany, on her side, might have peace.
" Above all, we were never told that German}/ would be allowed to retain the possessions she held before the war. ... As the Entente never declared their willingness to negotiate with a Germany that had no desire for conquest, but kept reiterating their desire to destroy Germany, we were forced into a defensive war on Germany's behalf and our role in Berlin was made amaz- ingly difficult."
These words, if spoken earlier, would have silenced all our talk about a peace of reconciliation and have revived the warlike spirit and so brought blessing to our people.
Count Czernin, however, held his peace, and so took on himself an enormous responsibility. Or perhaps he informed the Im-
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perial Chancellor and the latter neglected to enlighten the people. The German people has the right to know the truth.
It was not only in Berlin, as Count Czernin thinks, but in Vienna also, that a statesman was lacking who was equal to the demands of this war, and could collaborate with the military leaders in seeming victory.
The leading statesmen had no faith in victory, failed to find the road to peace, and yet remained in office.
VII
I deeply regretted the events which took place in Germany in the spring and summer of 191 7, as I did all other manifestations of weakness. They were bound to react unfavourably on our conduct of the war, and therefore on the subsequent peace. Looking back I can see that our decline obviously began with the outbreak of the Revolution in Russia. The Government was oppressed on the one hand by the fear that it might spread to Germany and on the other by the knowledge of their inability to revive the resolution and warlike ardour of the people, waning as they were through the combination of innumerable circum- stances. No doubt our precarious military position and, later, the want of success achieved in the submarine war, of which some people had unfortunately been too confident, made it more difficult to rouse our energy. It was obvious that it suffered from these causes.
But after all, owing to the collapse of Russia, our position in the summer of 1917 was better than that of the Entente. We were justified in being hopeful. But there were other reasons for our spiritual decline. The Government lacked the resolution to deal energetically with abuses. And behind it there was the Reichstag, with no united will, in part sincerely anxious about our future, in part merely striving for power from selfish reasons.
On the 7th April there was published a decree by His Majesty on the franchise. I only heard of it after the publication. Neither the Emperor nor the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann, ever
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spoke to me about internal affairs. Nor was it my business to originate discussions on these subjects, as internal politics had nothing to do with me.
The connection between the franchise decree and the Russian Revolution was too obvious. That was what made it so ill- advised. If a change in the franchise was necessary — as it doubtless was — it should have been made before the war, at the latest in August, 1914, with a grand geste, as the free gift of a strong Government. Worst of all, the Government now made the Crown the centre of political discussion, instead of keeping it clear of party strife. Besides, apart from a small section, this step pleased only the enemy, who probably grasped the reason for it with gusto. At every step the Government should have considered its probable effect on the enemy, as well as at home.
During the war home politics should have been dominated and directed by consideration of the effect on the enemy. The greater the prominence given to questions of internal politics, the lower the warlike ardour of the nation will sink. Any statesman should know that. The decrees of 7th April and nth July disclosed our weakness to the enemy and revealed our fear of revolution. The enemy must have said to himself that there is no smoke without fire and a conflagration is therefore possible. Revolution will come. He must therefore have concluded that he had only to hold out and fan the flame to attain his object — revolution in Germany and her ultimate destruction.
The effect of the April decree at home was very much what it was abroad. The revolutionary elements perceived the Govern- ment's anxiety and became more exacting. Their reply was the strikes of the second half of April. They were an echo of the Russian Revolution and proved how dreadful was the lack of sympathy with the fighting men at the front. They also showed to what extent the mass of the workers had escaped from the control of their leaders. The decree produced no soothing effect, as the Government had hoped. It was too late for that and the Government itself was too weak and too incapable of producing anything new from its own resources.
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The people were not much affected by the Prussian franchise ; only a few politicians and newspapers took a lively interest in it. Unfortunately it proved an instrument to widen the split at home and intensify the secret agitation. No one in the Army took any interest in the question. The Navy, which was nearer home and not engaged in active operations, is said to have been less apathetic. The thought of elections in time of war only filled me with anxiety. They were bound to reduce our strength still further. I also considered an election to be an injustice towards the soldier at the front who could, of course, according to the ideas prevalent at that time, take no part in it. I was drawn into the party conflict by partisans and opponents of the right to vote, although I never expressed my opinion on the matter in public. I often spoke of this to the Ministers.
Personally, I hoped a solution of the franchise difficulty might be found in a professional qualification such as Bismarck had had in mind. This, perhaps, might have imparted new vigour to our stagnant and sterile public life. At that time we had not yet reached that stage. Now we have a new, vague catchword : " Anchoring the workmen's councils in the constitution," which again points to some sort of representation by professions, at any rate in the First Chamber. It is inconceivable that only one class should have constitutional rights and the rest be sent empty away.
Further events announced the waning of our ardour — which had been alluded to with such kindling words in the Reichstag on the 27th February — before the Russian Revolution. In utter disregard of the destructive intentions of the enemy, the idea of peace by reconciliation made ever greater progress among the German people. It was swallowed most eagerly by those who feared the effects of victory on their political aspirations. During May and June a number of delegates, with facilities from the Government, undertook journeys to Stockholm, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. We walked into the traps of the Entente. I was against these journeys and so was the Commander-in- Chief in the Marches. The Emperor decided in favour of them, and the deputies of the General Staff in Berlin had to prepare the
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passports. Count Czernin also sent the Socialist leaders of Austria-Hungary to Stockholm.
From there, supported by the Russian Revolution, the labour- ing classes of the hostile states were to be called upon to proclaim and carry out the " Reconciliation of Mankind." These endea- vours revealed woeful ignorance of human nature, and certainly took no account of the spirit of the enemy nations, nor of our own ; they did, however, in some cases pursue decidedly revolu- tionary objects. No impression was produced on the enemy, but with us and in Austria the fighting spirit was weakened more and •more. Confidence in our own strength was lost. Government allowed the conduct of affairs to slip more and more from its grasp ; and the worst of it was, it abandoned them, not to the people as a whole, but to certain groups which, throughout their history, had always displayed critical and never constructive faculties.
These assemblies and all the talk of peace by understanding suited the Entente very well. They disclosed our state of mind. But, with a clear idea of national feeling, they allowed no Socialist leaders to go to the meetings and declined to be bound in any way. They pursued quite different aims.
In the summer of 1917 the French Premier, Ribot, expressed his country's intention of destroying Germany so clearly that no misunderstanding was possible without deliberate self-deception. No one with the slightest sense of reality could doubt that for the Entente all the beautiful catchwords were mere window- dressing, intended to deceive the multitude, and to give might the appearance of right. The Government, the Reichstag and most of the people took it all for gospel. In the Reichstag, for the first time in the war, Socialist representatives openly threat- ened revolution. The " helots' peace " (of which the Imperial Chancellor spoke to G.H.Q. about this time), which would come if we gave in before the enemy felt any inclination to peace, was on its way.
General Headquarters observed the great spiritual decline with increasing anxiety, and in view of the uncompromising attitude of the enemy Governments felt bound to draw attention to the
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harm that was being done to the people and the army, especially in Berlin. More than once the Field-Marshal reported to His Majesty how greatly G.H.Q. missed the support of the Imperial Chancellor. We had urged the latter more and more frequently to strengthen the war-spirit of the nation.
On the 19th June, 1917, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg wrote to him as follows, to warn him against the view that the war would be over that autumn at the latest :
" These dangers " (of submarine warfare) " are undoubtedly recognized by clear-thinking people among our enemies. If in spite of this they advocate continuation of the war, it is because they expect the collapse of Germany and her allies to take place before their own. It may be that they hope to bring about this collapse by a victory on land, but they rely far more on economic and political causes, such as food difficulties, shortage of raw materials, disunion, discontent, and the supremacy of the German Radical Social Democracy. They base this expectation on the waning of our power of resistance at home, the growth of inter- national sentiments, the state of our food supply, and the longing for peace to which we unfortunately give expression so often.
" A revival of our internal strength would be the most potent means of persuading our enemies of the futility of prolonging the war until their own means of existence are in danger of destruc- tion. On the other hand, every complaint of disappointed hopes, every sign of exhaustion and longing for peace on our part, or that of our allies, any talk of the alleged impossibility of standing another winter campaign, can only have the effect of prolonging the war."
The wording of the Chancellor's reply, dated the 25th June, revealed extraordinary depression. His way of thinking differed from ours. He could find no way out of the situation, and still less could he summon up the energy to act. He was afraid of that " helots' peace," but talked about a peace by under- standing, although he considered England's readiness for peace to be the necessary condition precedent and despaired of getting Lloyd George to agree to it.
However, his view of internal conditions soon became more
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hopeful, as we may see from a telegram to the Emperor of the 5th July.
In the meanwhile, on the 27th June, the Field-Marshal had himself written to the Emperor : " Our greatest anxiety at this moment, however, is the decline in the national spirit. It must be revived, or we shall lose the war. Even our allies need a powerful tonic, otherwise there is a danger of their deserting us. For this it is necessary to solve those economic problems which are the most difficult and are of the greatest importance for the future. . . . The question arises whether the Chancellor is capable of solving these problems — and they must be correctly solved, or we are lost ! "
An outward indication of the f alling-off of our spiritual capacity for war was afforded at the session of the Main Committee of the Reichstag on the 6th of July. Deputy Erzberger made a speech which utterly surprised us, in which he maintained that the submarine war was perfectly hopeless and that it was quite impossible for us to win the war at all. On this the spirit of the Reichstag broke down completely. The Imperial Chan- cellor had apparently been under a delusion when he changed his mind so suddenly on the 5th July. Now it was perfectly clear how far we had sunk. If things continued in this way in Germany, if nothing was done to encourage and strengthen the people, military defeat was indeed inevitable.
The War Minister agreed with us as to the bad effect of the events in Berlin on our military position and considered it necessary for the Field-Marshal to make a report to the Emperor on the subject. So the Field-Marshal and I proceeded to Berlin on the evening of the 6th. The Emperor, however, regarded those events as an entirely domestic affair which had nothing to do with the military authorities, and further considered that the latter should, constitutionally, be represented by the War Minister. So our presence in Berlin on the 7th produced no result in any direction and we returned to Kreuznach that evening.
The situation in Berlin became more acute. On the 8th of July the Chancellor, although at that time he accurately gauged the enemy's destructive intentions, agreed to the peace resolution vol. 11. 451 4
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which was to be put forward by the Majority parties and, at the same time, definitely promised them to apply the Reichstag fran- chise law to the elections for the Prussian Diet. Both these measures must have strengthened the enemy's will to an incal- culable extent. On the afternoon of the ioth the Imperial Chancellor felt obliged to hand in his resignation, which was, however, refused on the nth.
At Kreuznach we thought for a time that Prince von Biilow would succeed him. Further confusion was caused when, sud- denly, the Austro-Hungarian Government openly sided with the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann and against Prince von Biilow.
The Emperor had decided that Chancellor von Bethmann was to stay and the Crown Prince, who had arrived in Berlin, had given way. After all that had happened I could no longer believe that the Chancellor was the right man to perform the task demanded of him by this war and lead the country out of the depths of its depression to victory. It had become evident to me that, in order to conquer in the field, the General Staff needed the co-operation of the statesmen at home, and the better acquainted I became with the general situation after assuming duty the more convinced I was. This co-operation we had not obtained ; national thought and feeling at home had fallen off. The political leaders lacked creative force ; they had no ideal which would take hold of the people and thus develop their powers.
In 1914 we were aglow with patriotism, self-sacrifice and confidence in our own strength. We now needed fresh energy and impulse to make the German people forget the years of suffer- ing and distress, of bitterness and disappointment, replenish it with holy ardour, strength and confidence, and enable it to imbue its righting forces with fresh enthusiasm. The Imperial Chan- cellor underestimated the value of these moral forces. But the German people had to go on starving.
The Chancellor had permitted the enemy's refusal of our peace offer to pass by without letting the people know that, owing to the enemy's will, no just peace was possible, but that,
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on the contrary, as he believed and put it himself, a " helots' peace " was to be our lot. He had failed to imbue them with fresh warlike resolution and call upon them to fight for life and honour against a strong-willed enemy, striving for our destruction.
No, he himself despaired of victory and allowed the talk of an unattainable peace by understanding to shake our nerve, while it put all the trumps in the enemy's hand.
England's defiance of the laws of nations in employing the blockade against our very flesh and blood was not met by fiery protest ; the heart of the people was not filled with strong, manly hatred ; its holy ire was not directed against the inhuman enemy. Far from it. Discontent with the conditions at home, which were directly caused by the blockade, was permitted to spend its force internally, increase the effect of the blockade and disintegrate our national life.
The inhuman ill-treatment of our prisoners, the very flesh of our flesh, was not allowed to arouse any feelings which could be vented outside — though not, of course, against the prisoners in our hands. Instead, every expression of anger was suppressed, and the seeds of bitterness were sown.
When Wilson, on the entry of the United States into the war, attempted to drive a wedge between the Emperor, the princes and the people, the Chancellor did not arise to protect his Imperial Master. The Reichstag protested, but the Imperial Chancellor held his peace. He never called upon the people to defend the monarchical idea which, then as now, had its roots firmly fixed in millions of German hearts — he never pre- vented the axe being laid to the tree of the Imperial Office and the glory of the Empire.
Moreover, the political leaders lacked the strength to govern with firmness. At that time the mass of the people were not yet greedy for cheap phrases. They wanted to be sure that no unfair privileges were allowed as to living and conduct, and that in these respects everything was justly and equitably regulated. They also wanted peace, but never a peace such as we are now getting and could only have got even then. The vol. ii. 453 4*
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Government had lost the determination to win and its faith in German strength, which had so brilliantly manifested itself in the past three years and had only commenced to totter for want of leading. So the army did not receive what it needed for victory. I no longer believed that a change would take place under that Chancellor. The hope of being able to collabo- rate in complete accord with the Imperial Chancellor, which I had cherished when I went to General Headquarters, had broken down. So I wrote out my resignation.
The constitutional problems did not affect my military action. Personally, I considered the barrier which the Imperial Chan- cellor erected between the Emperor and the people to be deplorable. The Emperor could not become sufficiently acquainted with men. Several times, though in vain, I had asked Chancellor von Bethmann to let him meet leading men ; it could only serve to smooth matters over in a satisfactory manner. For this reason I thought it advantageous to include Parliamentary Secretaries of State in the Cabinet. I hoped, too, that through them the country would be more likely to receive what it needed for the war.
The Field-Marshal joined me and submitted his resignation at the same time. Our applications were dispatched to Berlin on the evening of the 12th, after we had sent a preliminary notification to General von Lyncker in the afternoon. Simul- taneously we received an urgent telegram from the War Minister who considered it necessary, in view of the military situation, for the Field-Marshal to make a further personal report in Berlin. The Emperor also wished to see us.
In the meantime the Crown Prince had had a conference on the morning of the 12th with the party leaders of the Reichstag, the majority of whom either declared themselves in favour of the immediate resignation of the Chancellor or else asserted that they attached no importance to his remaining in office. No one took his side.
On the Crown Prince's report the Emperor now decided to accept the resignation of Chancellor von Bethmann.
When we arrived in Berlin on the 13th the Emperor had
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already given his decision. I hoped that the man who was to assume office would be capable of concentrating the whole energy of the German people for a united effort.
On our first visit to Berlin, on the 7th of July, the Field-Marshal and I had been prepared to meet members of the Reichstag at the General Staff offices and give them information about the military situation in an informal manner. I was anxious to reassure them. This conversation took place in the afternoon of the 13th. Before the conference began, the Secretary of State, Dr. Helfferich, and Under-Secretary of State Walmschaffe talked with me in a very excited manner about the possibility of a peace resolution.
Our defensive attitude throughout the first half of 1917, the various failures near Arras, in the Wytschaete salient and in Galicia, where we had not yet attacked, the absence up to date of any decisive result from the submarine war and our serious situation as regards food and raw materials, had caused great anxiety. These were the matters we were to discuss. But everyone was thinking about the peace resolution which the Reichstag was to introduce with the co-operation of Count Czernin, possibly even at his instigation. This gave rise in Berlin to the completely erroneous idea that we had come to take part in the deliberations on the peace resolution. As a matter of fact, the deputies kept on coming back to it.
We summed up our view of the situation more or less to the effect that on land it was serious, but secure. We simply must hold out, since our enemies did not want peace. The ammuni- tion supply had improved and there was sufficient raw material. We made no reference to the impending operations in Galicia, both for the sake of secrecy and because their development could not possibly be foreseen. We had faith in the success of the submarine war, although up to date it had not produced the decisive effect that we had hoped for. In discussing the possi- bility of transferring the American Army to France, we put forward the naval opinion that it could only be considered feasible to a limited extent. To the peace resolution we were unable to give any support ; we explained that it did not meet
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with our views, since it was bound to exercise an adverse influence on the spirit of the troops and on the determination of the people, while the enemy would construe it as a confession of weakness. Its full effect must therefore be injurious. We also pointed out the evil consequences that might result from it in Bulgaria, where the demands for peace went very far.
The text of my argument was this : We shall win if the Army is backed up by a united people. That is where the people's representatives must help.
The meeting was quite informal. Herr von Helfferich re- quested the deputies to take no steps with regard to the peace resolution for the present. He invited them to meet him at the Ministry of the Interior the next day and the day after for a conference at which the new Imperial Chancellor would be present. The gentlemen accepted. However, early the next morning the peace resolution appeared in the Vorwdris. At the suggestion of Under-Secretary of State Wahnschaffe I had tried to prevent it, and had asked Deputy Siidekum to exert his influence on Vorwdrts in the same sense. The publication could, however, no longer be delayed. With that the Majority parties in the Reichstag had absolutely committed themselves Further discussion could serve no useful purpose.
Dr. Michaelis became Imperial Chancellor. Herr von Valen- tini, Chief of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet, had given the Field- Marshal the names of several gentlemen, of whom His Majesty would select one. Prince Billow, whom the Field-Marshal had on occasion suggested to the Emperor, was not among them. Count Hertling had refused and declared he could not co- operate with the General Staff, at which I was not particularly surprised.
From correspondence I had had with him through the Bavarian War Minister, von Hellingrath, I had unfortunately acquired the conviction that he and everyone else in Munich regarded the General Staff in the same light as did the Wilhelmstrasse. Count Hertling became Chancellor later and on his retirement he expressed to me his satisfaction at the hearty co-operation that had marked the relations between his office and General
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Headquarters. The Field-Marshal told Herr von Valentini that he should welcome any gentleman His Majesty might nominate. I was surprised to find that the authorities concerned did not have a successor to the Imperial Chancellor always in readiness, and that in a matter of such decisive importance for its destiny, Germany had to live from hand to mouth.
The path of our internal development had not afforded scope for the growth of strong personalities. It was quite striking to see how the officer class, the members of which were always thought to be the most narrow-minded, had produced men of decision, whilst the civil official class, on the contrary, had unfortunately so conspicuously failed in this respect. Men who were prominent in public life kept out of the way and followed their own professions. There may have been men of strong character in the Reichstag who could have guided the destiny of the country. The party sytem prevented their coming to the front. We were poor in men. Our political system had not produced new creative brains and by its barrenness it pro- nounced its own sentence.
Our participation in further parliamentary discussions of the peace resolution at the Ministry of the Interior had been sug- gested by the new Imperial Chancellor. I requested him to dispense with our attendance. I was convinced that we had fulfilled our task the day before and that it would only drag us into political controversy. The Chancellor persisted. As far as possible, we wished to support him in taking over his burden- some heritage, and therefore decided to comply. At the same time, we were desirous of showing Dr. Michaelis what value we attached to confidential collaboration with the Imperial Government. Both the Field-Marshal and I frequently wrote in this sense to the new Chancellor.
At the meeting we thought it most remarkable that the Majority parties based their demand for the peace resolution on the spirit of the country at the moment. Only by this means could the masses be rendered capable of holding out, if the wished-for peace did not materialize. This was a melancholy picture, far worse than I had expected. At the same time, the
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hope of a collapse of the enemy was expressed. The Russian Socialists were said to be desirous of forcing the other States of the Entente to stop the war. Otherwise no new points were raised.
As senior representative of the General Staff, the Field- Marshal again spoke against the resolution. I merely pointed out to the gentlemen sitting next me that the resolution con- tained not a single allusion to the Army. They therefore included a sentence expressing the thanks of the people to the Army.
When we left I requested Deputy Erzberger to stop the peace resolution. Beyond that I felt that my presence had not been necessary at this discussion of the question, and that I should have done better not to go. I said so later to the Deputy Miiller-Meiningen, among others.
From the tribune of the Reichstag the peace resolution went out into the world. As anticipated, it produced on our enemies no political effect whatever ; they took it as a confession of weakness. Bulgaria and Turkey began to doubt our victory. Nor was the effect in the country what the movers had hoped.
Instead of drawing the proper conclusion from the refusal of the enemy and strengthening the fighting spirit of the people, the Government gave no thought to the enemy, but entangled itself further and further in the unfortunate idea of a peace by understanding that could be had at any time. This was to prove the curse of the peace resolution. The General Staff con- sidered it a mistake from the military point of view. But the Field-Marshal and I authorized the Imperial Chancellor to announce our concurrence in his attitude towards it, because he wished to avoid a conflict with the majority of the Reichstag in the interests of the prosecution of the war. And so we also shouldered the responsibility for the resolution which we thought a lesser evil than internal confusion. To that pitch had things come in Germany. We hoped the new Imperial Chancellor might improve matters, even if only gradually, and therefore thought it necessary to meet his wishes.
In Berlin the deterioration of moral at home had literally
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thrust itself on my notice. I could not fold my hands and watch the spirit of our people fall still further and undermine our fighting capacity altogether. Consequently, I laid before the new Chancellor the request I had made to his predecessor in the previous December, that the direction of the Press and the education of public opinion should be put in the hands of an authority under his immediate control. He promised to discuss this application at the end of August.
VIII
The spirit of the people at home rendered action imperative. We had the best prospects of winning the war, but it was not over and what we had won had to be kept. We were still a long way from that. The popular state of mind jeopardized everything. Besides, efforts at direct propaganda in the Army were observable. The Quartermaster-General wrote on the 25th of July : " It is certain that the Independent Social Democrats are carrying on an agitation in the Army which is in the highest degree detri- mental to discipline." That this was the case at that early date is corroborated by the leader of the Independent Social Demo- cratic Party — Ledebour.
Speaking at a conference of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils in connection with the events that took place between the 5th and 9th of November, 1918, he said :
** These four days, up to the 9th of November, were utilized by Scheidemann and his associates to reap the fruit of nearly two years' work by the Independents."
Another leader, Richard Miiller, asserted : " The preparations for revolution were made as long ago as June, 1916, though the object was at the time not so clearly apparent."
The Independent Socialists had definitely paved the way for revolution for a long time. The majority of the Reichstag, and a section of the Press and the public, unfortunately helped on this work, often unconsciously.
In July, 1917, I had definitely come to the conclusion that
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under the circumstances General Headquarters could not remain inactive until the end of August. Whatever it could do to revive our spiritual capacity for war must be undertaken at once. I was aware that, so long as the Government did not itself take energetic steps in this direction, whatever we did would only be patch- work.
Nor, owing to the slowness and confusion of ideas prevailing in the Civil Government, had I any guarantee that the work would be done thoroughly, even if the new Chancellor were to take charge of the work of educating public opinion personally. It was not easy for him, either, to carry through innovations and establish some entirely new machinery, since most of the Government departments were dominated by the same spirit which had hitherto radiated from the Imperial Chancellor's office, or, at any rate, did not oppose it — the same thing, in its effects.
For a long time past I had been thinking over the problem of diffusing a knowledge of the national aims and needs in the Army. It now became a burning question.
In accordance with the proposal submitted to me by Lieut. - Colonel Nicolai, General Headquarters arranged for patriotic instruction in the Field Army. But this was only a poor sub- stitute for the work of enlightening public opinion at home, work which was done so consistently and effectively in the Entente countries.
The importance of patriotic instruction, or, as we first called it, the " work of enlightenment among the troops," was summed up in the following sentences :
" The German Army, owing to the spirit which animates it, is superior to its enemies and a powerful support to its Allies.
" At the beginning of the war the foundations of this spirit were enthusiasm and the discipline which had been inculcated during prolonged peace training. The three years of war have changed and enlarged these foundations. A comprehensible longing for home, family and calling, may weaken its war resolu- tion and take the edge off the will to hold out till the final victory is gained.
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
" The long duration of the war has also brought with it want and sacrifice in increasing measure, both at home and in the Army. The more these burdens oppress the spirit of the Army, the more must the foundations of fighting power be laid on conviction, sense of duty and definite resolve.
" To supply this need is the task of patriotic instruction in the Army."
On the 15th of September, 1917, I wrote :
" The enemy's determination to destroy us and the necessity for us to go on fighting are less obvious to the troops employed on the lines of communication, on garrison duty and at home, than to the fighting forces themselves. For this reason special attention must be given to the moral of the troops on the lines of communication, and patriotic instruction must be specially fostered among them.
" The proper course is to concentrate on the relationship between the home and the Army. From the spiritual point of view and for the fulfilment of the national tasks, the people and the Army are one. Consequently, great importance attaches to the cultivation of patriotic feeling among the people at home, a duty which is carried on in conjunction with the civil authori- ties. The prosecution of this task must be regarded as one of the most important duties of the military authorities at home."
I intentionally extended this patriotic instruction to the home territory, although in other respects I refrained from direct action there. But I could not sit still and let everything slide before my very eyes. I expected to produce a stimulating effect, but received not the very slightest assistance from the civil authorities, although the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, and Secretary of State von Kuhlmann recognized that some sort of machinery had to be created in order to raise the national spirit. An impression prevailed that nothing should be under- taken which might inflame national passions, for we had reached a point at which the development of national feeling was regarded as a damnable crime.
The War Minister agreed to the work of patriotic instruction being extended to the domain of the G.O.C/s of the Corps Dis
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
tricts. In the summer of 1918, at his request, he was given wide powers over these officers.
As the first object of instruction I recommended discussion of the causes of the war, Germany's economic development and its importance, the consequences of a lost war, especially for the German workman, and the necessity for continuing the struggle until we had broken the will of our enemies and created a safe foundation for further economic development.
I further laid stress on our justifiable hope of final victory, and the need for leadership and authority on the one hand and discipline on the other.
" Thoughts of self must be suppressed in view of the great common aim. Strikes endanger the success of the war and are paid for by the blood of the troops. Dreams of peace prolong the war, and so does discontent. Unity at home makes us strong ; everything else is weakening."
I designated as our object in the war the " safeguarding of our future," and closed with the words : " Army and people must unite in backing up the leaders of the Empire with all their strength until peace is finally concluded."
These instructions were based on the military situation at the time. They were the natural counter-measure to the wretched ideas prevailing at home. I believed in our final victory and feared disaster. I did all I could to show the people how serious was the situation without still further depressing them. I set great value on the moral factor, like many others ; but among them were men who deliberately undermined the fighting capacity of the German people and with it discipline in the Army. Be- tween these two extremes stood the great bulk of the nation who had no conception of the spirit of their own people nor of that of the enemy.
In my view the War Press Office ought insistently to direct the authorities responsible for the work of enlightenment to describe the dangers of a lost war.
Patriotic instruction was to be kept away from all party in- trigue. In this I included attack on, or defence of, the peace reso- lution and discussion of our war aims I tolerated no departure
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
from this principle. But I had no objection to superior officers expressing their own opinion on war aims to their men in a calm and objective manner, provided the latter approached them on the subject in a spirit of confidence.
It was a bad sign that in October this subject of instruction was approached in the Reichstag solely from the point of view of narrow party politics, while its real significance was mis- understood. The regulations for the instruction were closely examined and nothing objectionable was found in them. I was curious to see whether any demand for Government action would be put forward, or whether it might feel itself called upon to take up the matter. But the Reichstag was content merely to criticize ; useful work was no part of its programme. The Government was glad to have steered past an obvious reef. But the public remained ignorant of the dangers which menaced it.
There were still men in Germany who had correctly gauged the enemy's mind. They desired to strengthen the fighting spirit and founded the " Fatherland Party " (Vaterlandspartei). I had no connection with them. But their work was most welcome to me in the interests of the war ; that their objects went too far did not matter. The storms of war guarantee that no trees grow up to the sky.
I began to hope that the Fatherland Party would at last do some good but my hope was short-lived, for it was soon dragged into the orbit of domestic politics. We were going in for internal politics instead of war politics. Its name may have been unfortunate and various circumstances attending its founda- tion may have been detrimental to the cause, but its energy was broken by its opponents and by the Government. In this Count Hertling not only followed the lead of the Majority parties. To my horror I found it coincided with his own private opinions. Instead of providing allies for those who were carrying on the war the Government took away those we had without supplying their place itself. Such was the state of affairs ; the Lord in Heaven forsook His German people, because it had forsaken itself.
I attached importance to gaining a personal knowledge of
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the working of patriotic instruction. Accordingly, I arranged for the Propaganda Officer at Saarbriicken to give a lecture at Kreuznach of the same nature as he was delivering in public. The lecturer, Lieutenant Schmetzer, described the effects of an unsuccessful war on our working classes most effectively. He showed that they would be deprived of work and food or become the slaves of international capital. I can only say that all of us who heard the lecture were deeply impressed. I considered it to be of general interest, especially to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and had it repeated in his presence. Unfortu- nately, the hopes I had based on it were not realized.
It was not to be expected that the regimental officers, par- ticularly the young company commanders, who were fully occupied with their daily duties, would display a sufficient grasp of the possibilities and requirements of patriotic instruction. I therefore wished it to be directed by officers who were in touch with the state of feeling both in the Army and at home, and who were particularly qualified to enter into the way of thinking of the men at the Front. They in turn were to get into touch with suitable officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and obtain the assistance of men from home. We were confronted with an entirely novel task and had to overcome suspicion and numerous difficulties in the Army itself. Nor was it easy to find suitable propaganda officers. Much time was bound to elapse before everything was working smoothly.
Even after patriotic instruction was instituted I continued to receive reports from the Army Headquarters as to the spirit and feeling of the Army and made use of every opportunity of obtaining an insight into its state of mind. Incidentally I heard that the chaplains were fulfilling their responsible office with devotion and ability and gave valuable support to the troops in the trenches.
In the Corps Districts at home the work was naturally even
more difficult than in the Army. There also men of all
parties helped us. The Government, however, held absolutely
aloof.
The soldier was particularly concerned about his future after
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
the war. This was natural considering the economic conditions at home, the ever-increasing selfishness and the ruthless profiteering. While I was still Chief of Staff to the Commander- in-Chief in the East, at a time when conditions at home had not yet become acute, I had, by means of communications to the Army newspapers, endeavoured to inform the troops of what was being done for disabled men and for dependents. I took much interest in these questions and observed with regret that the people at home showed less and less gratitude towards the disabled, and that the feelings of the latter were very often in- sufficiently considered. The question was one that concerned the whole German people, and should not have been exploited for party purposes.
Care for the soldier and for the dependents of the fallen was to me of vital importance. It could best be assured by final victory which alone would place it upon a sound foundation. But I wanted to do something more personal than that. A fund for the disabled was started in May, 1918, in which I collaborated and which was then called after me. The Luden- dorff Fund was a brilliant success. It was originated by an enthusiastic German lady, Fraulein Emma Tscheuschner, who was most energetically assisted in her great work by Director Henrich, and it raised far more than 150 million marks, a quite unprecedented result. During the Revolution it was renamed the " National Fund." Did the national delegates and the first Government of the German Republic object to my name being connected with a charitable institution which, mainly on account of my name, had brought in such great sums, and by which many thousands of disabled men have benefited ? I leave this action to the judgment of humanity and the disabled who enjoy well-earned benefits from the " Luden- dorff Fund," should they ever hear my name.
What has happened to the Fund under its new name I do not know. It is not in accordance with my ideas that advances have been made from it to take the place of state aid. That was not the intention. I wanted to help and it is now like a knife in my heart to see disabled soldiers, who are unable to earn their
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
living, going begging. That also, however, passes for gratitude and the national sense of duty.
It seemed to me a particularly important branch of the care of the disabled to discover how brave men who had lost limbs could be re-educated so as to recover their joy in life and work and thus be reinstated in their former surroundings and given back to the country. All endeavours towards this object, as well as the progress made in the manufacture of artificial limbs, I followed with active interest.
Care for the soldier included not only provision for the de- pendents and the disabled, but also arrangements for ensuring economic security after the war for the sound men who wished to work. That was a duty of the State and the people at home towards the class that had unselfishly done so much for them. Soldiers ought to have been given cheap houses and cheap land, with proprietary rights, in which speculation should have been forbidden. This, of course, could only be effected very gradually, and should not involve harshness to the original owner nor loss of his rights. I was much impressed by the opinions of the land-reformer, Herr Damaschke, on the need for reducing the cost of housing, especially for the working classes, and for ex- cluding profiteering, as also by his historical treatment of the subject. The information he gave about the scarcity of houses after the war of 1870-71 seemed to me of the greatest importance. G.H.Q. approached the Imperial Chancellor, pointed out the influence of the housing question on the after-effects of the war as regards national recuperation and requested him to bring in a bill to safeguard the rights and properties of soldiers. We also asked that means might be provided for building small houses and for securing them against speculation. G.H.Q. induced the Director-General of Medical Services, Lieutenant- General von Schjerning, to take an interest in the whole settle- ment policy to which he and his assistants, especially Major Dr. Hochheimer, devoted themselves with great enthusiasm. Their ideas were embodied in a memoir which was also sent to the Imperial Chancellor.
After the war I wanted to bring up a contented generation,
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
capable of self-defence. In the Baltic littoral I wanted to create a large settlement area for soldiers, and for the large number of Germans who were expected to re-emigrate from Russia. The vast uninhabited and unfilled areas in those parts provided room for German settlements without crowding out the inhabitants- Alsace-Lorraine also was to be used for settlements, and in this way this ancient German territory would at last regain its Ger- man character. A wide field of labour of the greatest national importance was before us. General Hahndorff took up these questions in a far-sighted manner. Co-operative Settlement- Companies, assisted by the most experienced men in Germany, were started and set to work at once. At that time people got wildly excited about the settlement-companies. The soundness of the fundamental idea was proved later. One of the first measures of the Republican Government was to draft a settle- ment-law, of which the guiding principles were taken from the edicts for Courland drafted by Professor Ludwig Bernhard on behalf of G.H.Q. Its practical application is now impossible owing to the extraordinary rise in prices and to the difficulty of ob- taining building materials. In the matter of helping the war victims, also, the Revolutionists have watered down the original schemes ; they have taken instead of giving. Money has been wasted, but the deserving soldier got none of it.
We also provided for the students and advanced schoolboys who were on active service, and whose future became more and more precarious as time went on. I hoped that the assist- ance afforded to them would prove of special benefit to the country. The Prussian Minister of Education, Dr. Schmidt, felt strongly on this subject and took the lead in the work.
IX
Besides the actual conduct of the war and the big questions
connected with it I had a great many other duties to attend
to at Kreuznach ; they were apparently unimportant, but yet
formed part of the whole process. Life had settled down to
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the same sort of routine as at other headquarters. The Field- Marshal and I, with other officers, lived in a villa which had once formed the home of the Emperor William I., that great monarch and judge of men, under whose sceptre Germany's dream of union had been realized. Our office was in the Oranien- hof. The distance to it was short, and my regular walks to and fro afforded an opportunity to many kindly disposed people who wished to please me by their greetings and, at times, by gifts of flowers. Otherwise I led a secluded existence because — I know men.
Every day I went for exercise to the " Rose-garden " above the town, or perhaps merely into the grounds near the Oranienhof, rarely anywhere else. In the spring of 1918 this beautiful Rosengarten and the garden in front of the Oranienhof were destroyed in a few hours by tearing floods. As the Revolution passed over Germany in the autumn, so the flood passed over Kreuznach in the spring. What had taken the townspeople many years and an infinite amount of trouble was demolished in a few hours. It happened terribly quickly. The clearing up of the gardens and houses and the removal of the dirt and mud began at once, but it took a long, long time, and traces of the flood remained everywhere. Was that an omen ?
We had many visitors who came and went, and in spite of my enormous burden of work I had to find time to spare for all of them. I had also to confer with the representatives of the Prussian and Bavarian War Ministers on the maintenance and increase of the fighting capacity of the Army. Moral at home and the question of reinforcements were matters which never disappeared from the agenda. Questions relating to the future of the Army were also dealt with. Ideas on disarmament were as prevalent as those on peace by understanding, and as little in accord with the existing state of affairs. To disarm before changing the whole existing order of the world seemed to me, as a practical man, just as impossible as it did to the democratic Governments of England, France and the United States. Food and other problems of the home country often came before me. In a word, all the fundamental elements of warfare were continu-
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
ously dealt with, revised and, as far as I was able, organized to meet our requirements. Applications for what we could not supply from our own resources were submitted to the Imperial Government ; with what sad results I have shown in reference to our most pressing need, that of arousing the warlike ardour of the German people.
As regards war politics, I had mainly to deal with the Dobrudja, the area administered by the Commander-in-Chief in the East, and Alsace-Lonaine.
In the Dobrudja the struggle between the Bulgarians and the German Line-of-Communication Administration continued, with all its many side-issues. In June the Tsar of Bulgaria came to Kreuznach with Radoslavoff, who now tried to get the line-of- communication area placed under Bulgarian administration, which amounted to his obtaining the Dobrudja for Bulgaria. This led once more to a great deal of argument. I raised the question of Germany's exploiting the rich coal-fields of Serbia for the common benefit of the Quadruple Alliance during the war ; some notes were made, but nothing more was done. It was a waste of time while my thoughts were so fully engaged with events at the Front. Owing to the enormous restraint I had often to impose upon myself this extra work was an intolerable thing to expect of any man. So stern a course of self-education would do many people good. In the present case G.H.Q. succeeded in defeating the Bulgarian project, or at any rate shelving the question indefinitely. Even now the Government failed to induce M. Radoslavoff to secure the recall of the U.S.A. Charge d'Affaires from Sofia. I assume that it really made another serious attempt.
I had left the territory of the Commander-in-Chief in the East at the end of August, 1916. The administrative system I had introduced was only adapted to military needs ; it con- tinued to work well in 1917. Its operations had now to be developed more on the political side.
It was to be expected that the proclamation of the Kingdom
of Poland on the 5th November would have a depressing effect
on the Lithuanians and would produce a Pan-Polish agitation
in the territory under the Commander-in-Chief in the East. The
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guiding principles laid down for an impartial treatment of ques- tions of nationality were by themselves no longer sufficient.
At my request Secretary of State von Jagow published an official announcement in the papers of the occupied territory, with the object of calming the Lithuanians. This announce- ment appeared simultaneously with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland. The Lithuanian movement, which had hitherto emanated exclusively from Switzerland, now began to be manifested in the country itself, and the Pan-Polish movement, of which the object was the union of Lithuania with Poland, grew at the same time. We had no reason to permit these agitations. Poland had clearly shown, in the matter of raising the Army, that she was merely a political war-profiteer. We could no longer consider anything but our own future, and the dangers which might threaten us from Poland. In accordance with our previous policy the Commander-in-Chief in the East was there- fore instructed that any strengthening of the Poles, which could only come about at the cost of other nations, was undesirable.
The Lithuanians entered the lists against the Poles by expressing their feelings and wishes more forcibly. In March, 1917, they submitted a representation on the subject to the Commander- in-Chief in the East. The latter now sent in a memoir on the methods to be followed by German policy in the territory under his administration. We passed the memoir on to the Imperial Chancellor, with the request that he might give a definite de- cision as to the policy to be adopted in regard to the nationalities in the area administered by the Commander-in-Chief in the East. G.H.Q. considered it out of the question to pursue a purely Polish policy. The establishment of a Poland that would surround East and West Prussia was incompatible with the security of Germany. German rule in the territory under the Commander-in-Chief in the East must be based on the Lithu- anians and the White Ruthenes. At the same time wre suggested a conference on these questions, the early solution of which I very greatly desired. In this, as in all other matters, I main- tained that the Imperial Chancellor must lay down the guiding principles of policy, with the sole limitation that they must be
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
compatible with military security. The execution of the political instructions was in this case the duty of G.H.Q. and of the Com- mander-in-Chief in the East.
On the 5th April we had the first conference with representa- tives of the Imperial Chancellor, under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General, General Hahndorff, at Bingen.
The Field-Marshal and I considered that the territory adminis- tered by the Commander-in-Chief in the East should ultimately be divided into a Duchy of Courland and a Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and with the further object of adjusting their respective interests, both should be in the closest relationship to Germany, and united under the personal sovereignty of His Majesty, either in his capacity as King of Prussia or Emperor of Germany. In this way Germany would gain a military defence against further surprise attacks by Russia, and also land for the settlement of our troops after the war.
The boundaries of Courland were already fixed.
The settlement of the Lithuanian question was difficult. Generally speaking, the mass of the Lithuanian people, though interspersed with big Polish landowners, lives north of the line Dvinsk-Vilna-Olita-Suvalki. South of it they radiate into the country of the White Ruthenes, which, however, is permeated by Poles and very Polish in spirit. Vilna, Grodno and other towns were Polish. The solid mass of Polish population only began at Byalistok. Jews were to be found all through Lithuania. Germans lived mainly on the East Prussian border. In the territory under the Commander-in-Chief in the East, south of Courland, the Lithuanians were in a small majority, and so formed a counterpoise to the Poles. They were menaced by them in precisely the same way as we were on our eastern borders, and so were our natural allies, whom we must seek to strengthen and attach to ourselves by every possible means. On the 5th April my argument did not go as far as this. My immediate object was to obtain the Imperial Chancellor's consent to a pronounced pro-Lithuanian policy. Nothing definite resulted from this conference.
On the 23rd April a second conference took place at Kreuz-
47i
My War Memories, 1914-1918
nach. After the outbreak of the Revolution Russia had made extensive promises to the Lithuanians. Now even the Imperial Chancellor admitted the necessity of formulating a clear line of policy with regard to them. On the 30th April a general agree- ment was reached to the effect that in the whole of the territory under the Commander-in-Chief in the East our action was to be based on the following principles : Everything German was to receive favourable treatment, but even the merest ap- pearance of forcible germanization, of which I had never ap- proved, was to be avoided. The word " germanize " has always been abhorrent to me. The Lithuanians were to be won over by all possible means, and the White Ruthenes in the northern district to be brought more in touch with them. In consideration for the Poles the latter object was not to be pursued in the south.
Polish propaganda was to be prevented, but without coming into conflict with the policy of the Governor-General of Warsaw by combating it in public.
The enunciation of these principles did not finally commit the Imperial Government, but it did enable us to follow a settled policy with regard to the Lithuanians. On the 30th May the Commander-in-Chief in the East, in agreement with the Govern- ment, published a decree permitting the formation of a Lithu- anian Confidential Council, in which the Lithuanians were to form the majority, the other nationalities being represented by single members. The Confidential Council was intended to be the official channel by which the wishes of the Lithuanians were to be communicated to the administration.
The general conditions made it more and more imperative clearly to define our intentions in the eastern territories. The catchwords " peace without annexations " and " self-determina- tion of small nations," which had been invented by hostile propa- ganda, were likely to lead to a solution of the Lithuanian prob- lem which would be detrimental to German interests. It opened the way for the Poles to become supreme in districts where they had not hitherto been so.
On the 2rst July, when the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, had just attained his exalted position, G.H.Q. approached the
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
Foreign Office with the proposal to pursue a policy of local nationalism in Courland and Lithuania, that in Lithuania being definitely Lithuanian in character. We made a final attempt to carry out our ideas with regard to these two countries. In both of them " Local Councils " were to be instituted.
On the 25th July Secretary of State Zimmermann agreed to our policy being initiated at once. Our success in Galicia had cleared up the situation still further. The Secretary of State merely dissuaded us, H in view of the impossibility of foreseeing the future," from " binding ourselves publicly, or even only mentally, to the definite project of a personal union." Later on, however, he declared that he " by no means intended definitely to decline that form of organization." When the Government would publicly announce this policy was its own affair ; I was content with having obtained its consent to a definite policy. I expressed my satisfaction at our having reached an agreement as to the immediate policy to be followed in the territory under the Commander-in-Chief in the East. The latter received instructions early in August with a view to the formation of " Local Councils."
I hoped that, with the necessary firmness and perseverance, we should attain our object, and that by this arrangement the Lithuanians would obtain their rights better than by joining either Russia or Poland. Competent judges among them had perceived that they could only maintain their nationality with the aid of Germany. Among these were the clergy whose superior intelligence, and the fact that we had promoted the return of the Bishop of Kovno, made them well-disposed towards us. The Lithuanian democracy believed in the power of the catchword " self-determination," although, owing to the mixed pop ulation of the country, it could not possibly be applied with justice. Being tied up in political theories, they did not see the Polish danger which actually menaces their land.
The third problem which occupied me in the summer of 19 17 was that of Alsace-Lorraine. G.H.Q. could of course approach it only from that point of view which it was our duty to repre- sent, the military one. The impressions I had gained as a
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
brigade commander at Strassburg, and the many sad experi- ences of this war relating to Alsace-Lorraine, had fully con- vinced me that its position as Imperial territory (Reichsland) was an anomaly which did not accord with the interests of the inhabitants. There was far too much meddling in its affairs by the Reichstag. The policy followed was weak and ill-de- fined, and could not satisfy anybody. I strove for a union of the country with Prussia, which by no means involved " Prus- sianizing " its inhabitants. Prussia had absorbed the Rhine Province, of which the population had retained its typical charac- ter and developed vigorously ; why should not the same path lead to the happiness of the people of Alsace-Lorraine who are by race and economic conditions closely allied to Ger- many. Other solutions also seemed possible. Whatever hap- pened, it was necessary to make certain of ensuring a single control of the troops on the frontier, the frontier defence system, and the railways. On carefully examining the question it was found to be very difficult to achieve this end by any other than the " Prussian " solution.
From the military point of view I expressed the opinion that the granting of autonomy was the least satisfactory solution. But whichever one was to be adopted, the fundamental principle was really to oppose the unjustifiable French influence and to replace it by the German ; in my view this involved the employment of German clergy and civil officials. The clergy was still recruited from French institutions, as also were some bodies of Sisters and female teachers. This was really scanda- lous. Was not Germany just as well able to provide clergy and teachers ? The civil officials ought also to have been imbued with German feeling. There was no need to select the notorious " East Elbians," who had done so much for Germany's great- ness, but whose natural hardness might possibly render them unsuitable for Alsace-Lorraine. The Rhine Province and South Germany could meet the demand.
Finally, French property in Alsace-Lorraine ought to be transferred to German possession, a transaction which the Entente had declared to be in accordance with the usage of
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The Entente Offensive in the First Half of 1917
war. In this way we should also acquire land for settling German soldiers.
The attack on private property was one of the abominations of this war. In 1870-71 Germans had been deported from France, an action which was at the time considered a special offence against international law, but France had left their private property untouched. Very soon after this war began England had proceeded to liquidate German businesses and by so doing had made plain why she had joined in the war. She wanted to remove the inconvenient German competition through- out the world and her example was followed by the other Powers of the Entente. The Black Lists served the same purpose ; they were also intended partly to increase the severity of the blockade. They caused the greatest suffering among the neutral countries, who — said nothing. The war of nations produced ever greater abominations.
It seemed to me necessary that the highest military and civil authorities should be in agreement as to the future of Alsace- Lorraine. Field-Marshal Duke Albrecht of Wurtemberg, who represented the military authority in Alsace-Lorraine since the spring of 1917, required clear instructions. I therefore suggested to the Government that a conference should be held. It took place. Nothing definite was achieved.
475
THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS AND THE COL- LAPSE OF RUSSIA IN THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN OF 1917
FOLLOWING on the prelude in the Wytschaete salient on the 7th June, the battle of Flanders began on the 31st July, after an artillery preparation lasting several days. This formed the second great strategic action of the Entente in 1917 ; it was their bid for final victory and for our submarine base in Flanders. The fighting spread over large portions of the Western Front, the Italian and Macedonian Fronts, and finally as far as Palestine.
The fighting on the Western Front became more severe and costly than any the German Army had yet experienced. In spite of this, the Western Armies could not be reinforced from the East, for there, at last, heavy work was to be done. Russia and Rumania were to be defeated, in order to enable us to force a decision in the West in 1918 by means of an attack on France combined with the submarine war, in case the latter should not achieve the desired result by itself. The situation required that I myself should undertake a great responsibility, so great that it shook even me. However, I had to do it, for in 1918 the dangers might otherwise become too much for us. It was, of course, obvious that G.H.Q. did not withhold from the armies of the West a single man who was not urgently needed elsewhere. During the further course of events the German Crown Prince often told me not to let the tension in the West become too great.
476
Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
1:200000
10 km
fromPoftf,
3 KPT
REFERENCE
German line at beginning of Flanders battle on 3117117. German line at end of August, 1917, German line, middle of No- vember, 1917.
Fig. 21. The Battle in Flanders, 1917. 477
My War Memories, 1914-1918
I knew well that G.H.Q., in imposing this enormous strain on the Western Front, had in view the possible situation in 191 8. I saw what the danger would be if the submarine war did not work after all. But I am not one of those who give way in the face of dangers ; I was put in my position in order to overcome them and to employ every means to prevent a great misfortune overtaking our country.
In the East we had to keep on hammering at Russia in order to bring about the fall of the Colossus. While the operations in Eastern Galicia were yet in progress I had telephoned to Colonel Hoffmann to ask what he thought of a crossing of the Dvina above Riga. For that, of course, troops were required which were at the time still engaged in Galicia. The Colonel was all for it at once, and the Commander-in-Chief in the East issued the first preparatory orders without delay. In the first days of August it became evident that our advance would have to be stopped in Eastern Galicia and the Bukovina, and that the offensive could not be resumed there until the railways had been repaired ; he was therefore instructed to carry out the crossing of the Dvina. At the time I believed it might take place about the 20th August and hoped that some troops would soon become available from there. By the middle or end of September, after the repair of the railways south of the Dniester, I thought we might be able to commence operations from the Bukovina across the Sereth into Moldavia. For that purpose the troops would have to be railed back again from Riga to the south.
From July 31st till well into September was a period of tre- mendous anxiety. On the 31st July the English, assisted by a few French divisions on their left, had attacked on a front of about thirty-one kilometres. They had employed such quan- tities of artillery and ammunition as had been rare, even in the West. At many points along the whole front the enemy had penetrated with tanks. Cavalry divisions were in readiness to push through. With the assistance of the counter-attack divisions, the 4th Army, whose Chief of Staff was now Colonel von Loszberg, succeeded in checking the hostile success and
478
Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
localizing its effect. But, besides a loss of from two to four kilometres of ground along the whole front, it caused us very considerable losses in prisoners and stores, and a heavy expenditure of reserves.
In August fighting broke out on many parts of the Western Front. In Flanders the Entente attacked again on the ioth, although they must have suffered severely on the 31st July. The ioth August was a success for us, but on the 16th we sus- tained another great blow. The English pressed on beyond Poelcapelle and, even with an extreme exertion of strength on our part, could only be pushed back a short distance ! During the following days fighting continued with diminished intensity. The 22nd was another day of heavy fighting. The 25th August concluded the second phase of the Flanders Battle. It had cost us heavily.
Further to the south several English divisions broke into our position north of Lens on the 15th August and captured an important height.
On the old battle-field of Arras, on both banks of the Scarpe, a hostile attack failed on the 9th.
Towards the end of August the Siegfried Line north of St. Quentin was unsuccessfully attacked by the French. It was not a serious affair.
Subsidiary French attacks were made on the ridge of the Chemin des Dames.
The main French effort took place at Verdun on the 20th and 2 1st August. The 5th Army was not surprised. As had been provided for weeks before, certain areas, such as the Talou ridge, were abandoned in time. The assault, which was not accompanied by tanks, again penetrated far into our positions. On the left bank, close to the Meuse, one division had failed, nor had we been fortunate on the right bank ; and yet both here and in Flanders everything possible had probably been done to avoid failure. The 21st and 26th also brought suc- cess to the enemy and loss to us. The French Army was once more capable of the offensive. It had quickly overcome its depression. Just about this time the statesmen in Paris
479
My War Memories, 1914-1918
put forward peace conditions which did not accord with the military situation.
The costly August battles in Flanders and at Verdun imposed a heavy strain on the western troops. In spite of all the concrete protection they seemed more or less powerless under the enor- mous weight of the enemy's artillery. At some points they no longer displayed that firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.
The enemy managed to adapt himself to our method of em- ploying counter-attack divisions. There were no more attacks
.1:180000
Ssmogneux ^^ rt _
V0 * ^mmfkBeaumont
iouvemont
iimujt
vacherauville
uaumont Vaux
German line at beginning of French attack on 2018117.
German line end of August, 1917.
VLKDUN
Fig. 22. The Battles at Verdun. August, 1917.
with unlimited objectives, such as General Nivelle had made in the Aisne-Champagne Battle. He was ready for our counter- attacks and prepared for them by exercising restraint in the exploitation of success. In other directions, of course, this suited us very well.
I myself was being put to a terrible strain. The state of affairs in the West appeared to prevent the execution of our plans elsewhere. Our wastage had been so high as to cause grave misgivings, and had exceeded all expectation. The attack on the Dvina had to be postponed repeatedly. Indeed, it became a question whether we could continue to bear the responsibility of retaining those divisions in the East.
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
The Crown Prince was not alone in his anxiety ; several Chiefs of Staff of very cool judg- ment shook their heads. But, in estimating the strength of our enemies, I always said to myself that in this war the only alternatives were victory or defeat, that their deter- mination to de- stroy us made any intermediate solu- tion impossible. In spite of all, I was convinced that the West Front would stand even more battering, though fate might have even greater trials in store for it. This was another case where human wis- dom failed.
General Head- quarters allowed the Dvina attack, from which it ex- pected great re- sults, owing to the
REFERENCE .
Austro-Hungarian hne
before the beginning of
the Italian attack. End
of August, 1917.
Anstro - Hungarian, line
at close of battle. ft
1 Km. = | mile. Fig. 23. The nth Battle of the Isonzo in August and September, 191 7.
481
My War Memories, 1914-1918
proximity of Petrograd, to proceed, although it did not intend to push it very far. From the purely strategical point of view it was merely intended as a means to a wholesale improvement of our position which would enable us to economize troops.
The offensive in Moldavia was still kept in view as a second decisive stroke. But this operation, which was delayed by difficulties in railway construction, came to nothing.
At the end of August the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo had begun on a front of seventy kilometres and proved successful for the Italians. Early in September the fighting was continued with determination. The Italians were again successful. The Austro-Hungarian Armies had indeed held their ground, but their losses on the Carso Plateau had been so heavy, and they were so shaken, that the responsible military and political authorities of the Dual Monarchy were convinced that they would not be able to stand a continuation of the battle and a twelfth attack on the Isonzo. The Austrian Army on the Italian Front needed stiffening by German troops. We could not carry our attack into Moldavia and to throw in German divisions in Italy for a pure defensive was not a measure which accorded with our critical situation. G.H.Q. had to take steps to carry out some offensive, if possible even a large-scale opera- tion, so as to bring about an improvement in the general situation somehow.
To abandon the operation in Moldavia was a disappointment. It seemed to me more important than one in Italy. It might, considering the situation in Russia, prove a decisive step towards ending the war on the Eastern Front. It could not then be seen that this object could be attained without considerable military effort, owing to the disintegration of the Russian State and Army. The attack on Italy might no doubt have a great effect and immediately relieve the Western Front ; but whether it would, in conjunction with the shortage of coal, produce a crisis in Italy could not be foretold. The general opinion was that it would not.
In spite of the difference in the value of the possible results, in the middle of September it became necessary to decide for the
482
Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
attack on Italy in order to prevent the collapse of Austria- Hungary. We had now only to examine how Russia, after the attack on Riga, could be damaged further in a way likely to accelerate her dissolution. Moltke's saying : " Strategy is a system of expedients," remains as true as ever.
At the end of August and early in September I had much to endure. I had a great amount of business with Berlin. On a journey to the West I met with a railway accident. Another
REFERENCE
German line before the attack, 119117.
German attach, 1/9/17.
German position after the attack.
Fig. 24. Riga. 1917.
train ran into the coach in which I was dining with my officers and overturned it. But that only caused a momentary fright. A severe blow was the death of my eldest son, or, rather, the eldest son of my wife by her first marriage. I have no children of my own. I was deeply attached to my son, as to all my step-children, and had seen him at Lille only a short time before, fresh and strong and full of enthusiasm for his profession and his country.
He was shot down over the Channel. Not till weeks after- wards did we find his body washed up on the Dutch coast.
This high tension was followed by a period of inactivity, vol. 11. 483 6
My War Memories, 1914-1918
commencing in Flanders at the end of August, at Verdun and in Italy at the beginning and middle of September. How long it would last no one knew.
Between the 30th August and 8th September the Entente had also made heavy attacks on several parts of the Macedonian Front, but without success. Local engagements in the mountains west of Lake Ochrida had an important bearing on the main operations inasmuch as they forced the Bulgarians to extend their line.
In Rumania there was some fighting between the Sereth and the frontier mountains. Otherwise there was but little activity on the whole Eastern Front right up to Riga. A local attack by German troops near Czernowitz was merely intended to rectify our line, which was urgently necessary.
The Front between the Carpathians and Tarnopol was now thinned out in order to obtain reserves for the next operations.
On the 1st September we effected the passage of the Dvina at Uxkull, south-east of Riga, opposite a strong enemy position. Helped by various higher commands, General von Hutier, commanding the 8th Army, and his Chief of Staff, General von Sauberzweig, had made very thorough preparations. The crossing was successful. The Russians had evacuated the bridge- head on the left bank in time and with few exceptions offered but slight resistance here also. I breathed again when the blow had at last fallen. We soon halted the 8th Army, and behind the furthest point of its advance it at once set about fortifying a position on the shortest line between the Dvina and the Gulf of Riga. Two divisions left immediately for the Western Front in order to relieve others for Italy. The Eastern Front had to send considerable forces there. In spite of our intention to strike at Italy and the extremely critical situation in the West, where fighting might flame up again at any moment, the Commander-in-Chief in the East still retained a certain surplus in order to keep Russia busy. It was a poor substitute for the offensive in Moldavia, but still better than nothing. If, after the event, I am charged with dispersion of force, I must put up with it. Things do not always work according to plan — and I achieved my object.
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
II
Apart from the lack of vigour shown by the troops, the defect of the Austro-Hungarian offensive from the Tyrol in 1916 was that the forces with which it was undertaken were too weak for the point at which it was made, and that the Army on the Isonzo did not attack at the same time. From a military point of view it was tempting to dally once more with these ideas and possibilities ; but in September, 1917, I had to base our plan of campaign on the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Armies were very exhausted at the moment and that Germany could not spare more than six or eight divisions. With such forces an attack from the Tyrol would have been absurd. They could only achieve results by striking at a point where the enemy was particularly weak and not expecting attack. If, furthermore, the selected point admitted of a strategic exploitation of the break-through, as had been the case in Eastern Galicia, every immediate requirement would be met. Further developments would have to be left to careful preparation and the decision of arms.
The front between Flitsch and Canale was suitable for attack, although the difficulties of the ground seemed almost insur- mountable, and the communications on the Austrian side were as bad as could be imagined. But the Italians themselves were not expecting to be attacked there and holding the line with weak forces. If we succeeded in surprising them and bursting over the mountains north of Cividale towards Udine, the Italian line on the Isonzo would totter.
We could now begin to consider the operation itself. The warmest supporter of the plan was Lieutenant-Colonel Wetzell. It was first necessary to determine whether the attack on this front was possible at all and if so, how it could be made. With the consent of General von Arz, General Krafft von Dellmen- singen who was then Chief of Staff to the Army Group of Duke Albrecht, and Major Freiherr von Willisen were ordered to vol. 11. 485 6*
My War Memories, 1914-1918
reconnoitre the ground. Their report showed the attack to be feasible, and formed the basis of further decisions by G.H.Q. I now gave myself up completely to this new great task.
General von Krafft and Major von Willisen had also made some excellent suggestions for the equipment of the troops. On this subject G.H.Q. at once communicated with the Austrian General Headquarters who were asked particularly to provide pack transport and mountain artillery for the German forma- tions. Both before and during the war the German Army was often in difficulties for want of mountain artillery and a certain amount was provided. But of course what we had was in- sufficient for this campaign. Austria-Hungary was perfectly well able to help, and there was no reason why we should always provide everything ourselves.
The selection of the troops was most important. The first to be chosen were units like the Alpine Corps which had gained experience in mountain warfare in the Carpathians and were suitably equipped. These were the 117th and 200th Infantry Divisions, at that time in the Bukovina, which were to be set free by the Austro-Hungarian troops in that area taking over their front.
Generally speaking, G.H.Q. wanted to employ divisions which had fought only on the Western Front, or suffered par- ticularly severely in operations in other theatres. But, owing to the importance of the Western Front, and the small numbers that could be drawn from it, the wishes of many formations to fight in other localities and be employed in an offensive, could only be met to a small extent. The choice now fell upon the 5th, 12th and 26th (Wiirtemberg) Divisions and a few Jager Battalions, which were later formed into the German Jager Division. Six to seven divisions were made available against Italy ; two were taken from the Western Front, where they were replaced by the two from Riga.
In addition, the East was to release two more divisions, which, if the situation at all permitted, were to be sent later to Italy, otherwise to the West.
The divisions detailed were also provided with German forma-
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
tions of artillery, engineers, trench mortars, aeroplanes, balloons and signals, motor and horse transport, and lines 01 com- munication establishments ; everything, in a word, which an army needs. The troops were given such mountain equipment as was necessary by the Intendant-Generals and their respec- tive War Ministries. Training in mountain warfare began at once. The artillery required special training in shooting in mountainous districts.
It was arranged with General von Arz that the Germans, with a contingent of Austro-Hungarian troops, were to form the 14th Army, under General Otto von Below who had hitherto commanded the 6th Army. General von Krafft became his Chief of Staff, and Major von Willisen joined the 14th Army Headquarters as Senior General Staff Officer.
In the 6th Army, General von Below was succeeded by General von Quast, a man of clear judgment and a resolute leader. In the Army Group of Duke Albrecht General von Krafft was replaced by Colonel Heye, who had for a long time served with distinction as Chief of Staff to General von Woyrsch.
The preparations for the operation had involved a great deal of business with the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. at Baden. General von Waldstatten was often at Kreuznach. From the outset it was agreed that the German Army should make the main attack, on which everything depended. It was therefore assembled at the decisive point on both sides of Tolmino. The German Jager were moved into the Flitsch Valley.
The Emperor Charles wished the operation to be conducted by the Austro-Hungarian High Command. I secured, however, a sufficient voice for our own General Staff through our prepara- tions, the interspersion of a German Army Staff, and a system of telephonic communication.
Unfortunately it was clear that the operation could not begin until after the middle of October.
The operations in the East continued in September. The bridge-head of Jacobstadt was captured on the 21st by a power- ful and well-planned attack. It was to be followed by the capture of the islands of Osel, Moon and Dago. This would
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My War Memories, 1914-1918
require one division and a brigade of cyclists, which were tem- porarily withdrawn from the coast of Flanders. The opera- tion had been in preparation, in conjunction with the Navy, since the middle of September. At the end of the month the fleet, transports and landing force were ready at Libau. Owing to unfavourable winds the execution of the landing was also delayed until the middle of October.
The postponement of the operation against Italy and the attack on the islands until the middle and end of October was to prove another enormous burden for us.
After a period of profound quiet in the West, which led some to hope that the Battle of Flanders was over, another terrific assault was made on our lines on the 20th September. The third bloody act of the battle had begun. The main force of the attack was directed against the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt line. Obviously the English were trying to gain the high ground between Ypres and the Roulers-Menin line, which affords an extensive view in both directions. These heights were also exceptionally important for us, as they afforded us ground observation posts and a certain amount of cover from hostile view.
The enemy's onslaught on the 20th was successful, which proved the superiority of the attack over the defence. Its strength did not consist in the tanks ; we found them incon- venient, but put them out of action all the same. The power of the attack lay in the artillery, and in the fact that ours did not do enough damage to the hostile infantry as they were assembling, and, above all, at the actual time of the assault.
Another English attack on the 21st was repulsed ; but the 26th proved a day of heavy fighting, accompanied by every circumstance that could cause us loss. We might be able to stand the loss of ground, but the reduction of our fighting strength was again all the heavier. Once more we were involved in a terrific struggle in the West, and had to prepare for a continuation of the attacks on many parts of the front.
October came, and with it one of the hardest months of the war. The world at large — which began in my immediate neighbour-
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
hood — saw only Tarnopol, Czernovitz, Riga, and later Osel, Udine, the Tagliamento and the Piave. It did not see my anxiety, nor my deep sympathy with the sufferings of our troops in the West. My mind was in the East and Italy, my heart on the Western Front. My will had to bring mind and heart together. I had not known what joy meant for many a long day.
The actions in the Third Battle of Flanders had presented the same set-piece characteristics as those in the Second and the fighting at Verdun. The depth of penetration was limited so as to secure immunity from our counter-attacks, and the latter were then broken up by the massed fire of artillery.
After each attack I discussed the tactical experiences with General von Kuhl and Colonel von Loszberg, sometimes at the Front, sometimes on the telephone. This time I again went to Flanders in order to talk over the same questions with officers who had taken part in the fighting. Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy. We could only proceed by careful experiment. The proposals of the officers on the spot tended rather in the direction of our former tactics ; they amounted to a slight, but only a slight, reinforcement of our front lines, and the abandon- ment of the counter-attack by the counter-attack divisions, local counter-attacks being substituted for this. These local counter-attacks were to be made by a division in the second line, to be brought close up and spread over a wide front, before the enemy's attack began. So, while the front line was to be held rather more densely once more, in order to gain in power, the whole battle-field was to be given more depth than ever. G.H.Q. would thus, generally speaking, have to provide a second division for every fighting division in the front line, an unheard-of expenditure of force. That the employment of a second division in rear of practically every one in the front line would increase the power of the defence was a simple sum in arithmetic. But the second sum was equally simple ; that our lines on other fronts would have to be thinned out even more than they had been hitherto. I said I would see what I could do. I agreed to the
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tactical changes, although misgivings were expressed among my Staff at this departure from the " Defensive Battle." I thought I ought to give way to the experience of officers at the front.
Another tactical detail which was emphasized everywhere was the value of ground observation for artillery. Only by that means could the attacking hostile infantry be annihilated, particularly after penetrating our front, or fire be concentrated on decisive points of the battle-field.
As to the tanks, opinion was calm ; they were not thought particularly dangerous. I purposely made use of the expression " tank-fright," but the officers from the front would not admit there was any such thing.
I need not say that from the first the 4th Army was as well supplied as possible with artillery, ammunition, aircraft and other weapons ; and Colonel von Loszberg, who always wanted a lot, was in the end satisfied with his Army Group and with me.
The officers in the West followed the Eastern and Italian operations with ever increasing anxiety.
Early in October the artillery action revived, and on the 2nd and 3rd artillery engagements of great violence took place. The infantry battle commenced on the morning of the 4th. It was extraordinarily severe, and again we only came through it with enormous loss. It was evident that the idea of holding the front line more densely, adopted at my last visit to the front in Sep- tember, was not the remedy. I now followed my own judgment without asking for further outside opinions, and recommended the 4th Army to form an advanced zone, that is to say, a narrow strip between the enemy's front line and the line which our troops were to hold by mobile defence. The enemy would have to cross this strip in making his attack, and our artillery would have time to get on to him before he could reach our main line of resistance. The great difficulty lay in withdrawing the garrison of the advanced zone in case of attack, and in bringing the ar- tillery barrage back to our own line. The term " advanced zone " has been defined in various ways, and ideas often became confused. The principle of it was simple. The 4th Army complied with my suggestion somewhat reluctantly, and did not accept it with
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conviction for some time. I never ceased to lay stress on the principles of the employment of artillery in masses and the utmost possible concentration of artillery fire.
There were further severe engagements on the 9th and 12th October. The line held better than on the 4th, although in some places the enemy penetrated to a considerable distance. The wastage in the big actions of the Fourth Battle of Flanders was extraordinarily high. In the West we began to be short of troops. The two divisions that had been held in readiness in the East, and were already on the way to Italy, were diverted to Flanders. The attack on Osel, at any rate, had commenced, but the Italian operation could not be started before the 22nd, and the weather held it up until the 24th. These days were the culminating point of the crisis.
Ill
The fifth act of the great drama in Flanders opened on the 22nd October. Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had never imagined before the war, were hurled upon the bodies of men who passed a miserable existence scat- tered about in mud-filled shell-holes. The horror of the shell- hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves, slowly; but steadily, and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine-gi;n jammed with the mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.
What the German soldier experienced, achieved, and suffered in the Flanders Battle will be his everlasting monument of bronze, erected by himself in the enemy's land.
The enemy's losses were also heavy. When we occupied the battle-field in the spring of 1918 we encountered the horrible spectacle of many unburied corpses. They lay there in thousands.
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Two-thirds of them were enemies, one-third German soldiers who had found a hero's grave there.
And yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer triumphed over the demoralizing effects of the defensive battle as they had done formerly.
On the 26th and 30th October and 6th and 10th November the fighting was again of the severest description. The enemy charged like a wild bull against the iron wall which kept him from our submarine bases. He threw his weight against Houthulst Forest, Poelcapelle, Passchendaele, Becelaere, Gheluvelt and Zandvoorde. He dented it in many places, and it seemed as if he must knock it down. But it held, although a faint tremor ran through its foundations.
The impressions I continuously received were very terrible. In a tactical sense, everything possible had been done. The advanced zone was good. The effectiveness of our artillery had considerably improved. Behind almost every division in the front line there was another in support ; and we still had reserves in the third line. We knew that the enemy suffered heavily. But we also knew he was amazingly strong and, what was equally important, had an extraordinarily stubborn will. Lloyd George wanted victory. He held England in his hand. Only one thing we did not know ; how long the battle would continue. The enemy must tire some time.
The French had attacked simultaneously. For this they had selected the favourable salient south-west of Laon, known as the Laffaux corner. We discovered their intention early in October ; the Army took all measures for defence and was supplied with everything it deemed necessary. In spite of other advice it wished to hold the salient, feeling confident of success. It made all its arrangements with meticulous care. All the same, G.H.Q. ought to have ordered the evacuation of the salient.
The French attack on the 22nd October was successful. One division succumbed to the effects of an exceptionally heavy gas- bombardment and gave way before the hostile assault. The enemy advanced towards Chavignon and so caused a narrow but deep indentation in the salient. This forced us to order its
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
evacuation, and the line was withdrawn behind the Oise-Aisne Canal. The losses were very serious ; once more several divisions were destroyed.
This withdrawal of our line inevitably entailed the evacuation of the Chemin des Dames ridge. It was ordered, and carried out on the night of the ist-2nd November, after the stores and equipment had been removed. In itself it was of no consequence whether we stood north or south of the Ailette, but after having fought all through the summer for possession of the Chemin des
REFERENCE
Fig. 25. The Battle at the Laffaux Salient. October 22.
Dames it was very difficult to order it to be given up. To hold on, however, would only have involved continuous wastage.
In pushing on towards the Canal on the 23rd the enemy gained further successes, but later on all his attacks, which curled round towards the north and also extended further towards the east, were repulsed.
As at Verdun in August, the French, supported by remarkable masses of artillery, had fought very vigorously.
While the October battles continued in the West until the combatants were exhausted, in the East the expedition against the islands had terminated in our favour. The campaign against Italy had begun. There our troops raced from victory to victory.
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In the West the crisis caused by the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of the Laffaux Salient and their after effects, passed away. We were expecting a continuation of the attacks in Flanders and on the French front, when on the 20th November we were sur- prised by a fresh blow at Cambrai.
The Siegfried position was but weakly held. The fighting further north, particularly the heavy concentration in Flanders, had induced the Army Group of Prince Rupprecht, with the con- sent of G.H.Q., to weaken the troops holding the Siegfried Line — tired, or Landwehr divisions — more and more. This brought about a serious element of danger, which we at once endeavoured to reduce. As things were, we had commenced the relief of tired Western divisions by strong Eastern ones in the East, and the 107th Division, which had entrained in the East about the middle of November, was intended for the neighbourhood of Cambrai. Its leading troops had just arrived when the blow fell.
Under cover of darkness and the great Havrincourt Wood, the English had, during several nights, concentrated a considerable number of tanks and cavalry divisions between the two roads converging on Cambrai from Bapaume and P6ronne. On the morning of the 20th, after a short, heavy bombardment, they advanced to the attack. The tanks overcame obstacles and trenches, and so opened the way for the infantry and cavalry divisions. When, soon after 8 a.m., I spoke with the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army he reported that the enemy had already broken into our line at several points. I at once ordered several divisions which were more or less rested, in rear of the group of the German Crown Prince, to be railed to the neighbourhood of Cambrai and south of it, and requested the group of Prince Rupprecht to move forces to the north of Cambrai. General von Kuhl had left by car for the 4th Army before hearing about the battle on the 2nd Army front. The divisions of this group were thereby delayed.
The order for a unit to entrain is by no means the same thing as its arrival. It has to march to the entraining stations, where trains have to be got ready for it. On the various lines the trains can only follow each other at certain definite intervals of time, and
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
the normal duration of the journey has to be added to all this. So it generally took two or three days for a division, using some
REFERENCE
German line when English attack be- gan on 201 11! 17. - ■«•
Line of departure of German counter- attack 30/11/17. fl\„
German counter- attacks.
Line reached by German counter- attack.
K150000 I , g i t J r f ? r f i *>**
l Km = | mile. Fig. 26. Cambrai. 1917.
thirty trains, to reach its destination. It could seldom be done in less.
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The first reinforcements could not reach Cambrai by train before the morning of the 21st ; not until the 23rd would sufficient troops be collected to oppose the attack. The lack of motor transport for moving troops was now much felt.
It was not until noon that I obtained a clear idea of the extent of the enemy's success. It made me very anxious. Everything possible, however, was already being done. So here again I had to leave things to take their course.
The English Army Commander did not exploit his great initial success, or we should not have been able to limit the extent of the gap. If he had done so, what would have been the judgment on the Italian campaign ? That was the sort of war we had to wage against the world. As a matter of fact, the blow was parried on the afternoon of the 22nd and on the 23rd, on the line Moeuvres — Bourlon — Fontaine — Noyelles — Masnieres. Even the troops which had been run over by tanks on the first day fought well, and so did the newly arrived 107th Infantry Division. To its intervention the early check to the enemy's attack is mainly due. It was immediately decided, if possible, to take the English attack in flank. In theory, a decision of that kind is easy to make ; but in practice, its execution was enormously difficult in the West. The assembling of the troops, their disposal for attack and bringing up the huge quantities of ammunition required take time. In the meanwhile, the defence itself consumes troops.
At other points the English and French Armies undertook nothing of importance. In the re-entrant in our line the fighting died down without the employment of excessive numbers on our part. By the evening of the 29th the Commander of the 2nd Army, General von der Marwitz, had collected enough troops for a counter-attack. The main effort was to be made on the southern part of the battle-field, in the direction of Banteux and Gouzeaucourt, while a subsidiary attack was to be made west of Bourlon in a direction due south. This time the English were surprised. Our attack on the 30th was well supported by artillery and succeeded, though not quite as well as I had hoped. But it was at any rate at last an offensive victory on the Western
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
Front. The foresight of the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army, Lieut. -Colonel Stapff, and the energy of the General had earned their just reward. The success was the more remarkable because it was in the main achieved by half-tired troops who had not been specially trained for attack.
There was only one serious feature. The success had not been as complete as it might have been, because a good division, instead of pressing on, stopped to go through an enemy supply- depot.
The English brought up reserves and counter-attacked. The battle went on until the 5th December, and during its course we regained a good deal of the ground we had lost and some new ground as well. We had won a complete victory over a consider- able part of the British Army. It was a good ending to the extremely heavy fighting of 1917. Our action had given us valuable hints for an offensive battle in the West, if we wished to undertake one in 1918.
Neither the English nor the French attacked again in France. The second strategic scheme of 1917 had also resulted in failure for them. A quiet period, which our exhaustion rendered so imperatively necessary, supervened at last in the West.
IV
The offensive against Italy at Tolmino began on the 24th October.
The Flitsch Group, under the Austro-Hungarian General von Krausz, and the 14th German Army were to seize the mountain range which follows the right bank of the Isonzo from about Flitsch to Canale and reaches its highest point in Mount Matajur, 5,420 feet, south-west of Caporetto. While all the other divisions were to ascend the range, the 12th, under General Lequis, was to move from Tolmino on Caporetto and then advance round the Matajur by the valley road towards Cividale.
The Army Group of General Boroevic was to join in the advance
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Fig. 27. The Campaign
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
My War Memories, 1914-1918
of the 14th Army, moving in a westerly direction from the Carso Mountains.
The deployment of the 14th Army had proved very difficult. Only two mountain roads were available and they were very narrow in places, so that movement in one direction only was possible. All the care and intelligence of the German staff officer was needed to ensure the movements taking place without friction and being completed to time. First of all the artillery and trench mortars, with large supplies of ammunition, were moved up in good time, under the feeble protection of a few Austro- Hungarian battalions. The infantry divisions were moved up last of all.
The deployment took days and was betrayed to the Italians. The desperate hostile attacks in the West in the second half of October had already some connection with our plans in Italy. Our weakness in the West was to be taken advantage of. Tacti- cally, Cadorna seems to have taken no steps. Possibly he thought the attack was hopeless.
After a few hours' bombardment by artillery and trench mortars with high explosive and gas shells, the ascent of the moun- tains began on the morning of the 24th, while the 12th Division pushed ahead in the valley towards and beyond Caporetto with the greatest energy. On the 25th the decisive mountain range was already in our hands and the Matajur was taken from several sides.
On the 27th we had already gained more ground in the moun- tains towards the upper Tagliamento and occupied Cividale. The Italian North Front on the Carinthian frontier, and the Isonzo Front both began to give way. Unfortunately Boroevic's Group did not follow up with enough energy, so that more Italians escaped than should have been the case.
General von Below was instructed to keep his right wing in the mountains, but to advance with his left by Udine and press towards Codroipo and the south, so as to strike a decisive blow at the whole enemy force to the east of the Tagliamento. In this way another 60,000 Italians were captured east of that river, which was reached on the 1st December along its whole course below Tolmezzo.
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Fighting in Flanders and Collapse of Russia
The 30th November was another good day. In France there was the victory of Cambrai and in Italy this fine success. As early as November I had requested General von Arz to rein- force General Conrad's Group in the Tyrol from that of General Boroevic and to make an energetic attack there, either down the Brenta or in the Asiago-Arsiero area. Now that the opera- tion we had planned had succeeded, General von Boroevic was too strong, General von Conrad too weak. General von Arz consented. But the railways were too bad, and no movement worth mentioning could be effected.
The Tagliamento was crossed on the 6th December and the Piave, from the Montello downwards, was reached on the nth. Other troops pressed on in the mountains towards Feltre. Before this advance the Italian Army on the upper Piave hurriedly fell back from the mountains through Belluno.
The right wing of the 14th Army was now deflected through Feltre towards the mountains between the Brenta and the Piave, in order to secure the exit into the plain. Elsewhere the Piave, being in flood, brought our advance to a halt. Beyond the Piave the Italians once more stood their ground in fair order. The first English and French reinforcements joined them.
Here, just as in August in the Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, the railways in rear of the armies had to be repaired before we could think of resuming operations in the plain. The weather in the mountains became unfavourable and the fighting there proved very exhausting. The troops continued to gain ground, but they did not succeed in capturing the critical Monte Grappa massif. The impulse of the offensive, begun on the Isonzo, had come to a natural end. Reinforcements would even now have carried it on some way, but General von Conrad had insufficient artillery, and his infantry were not strong enough to attack.
His advance began on the 4th December, much too late to affect the main operation, and very soon came to a standstill. The German General Staff would have been glad to send a division from the Western Front to the Trentino, but could not spare it in November. When this was eventually done it was too late. Here again the railways were too bad.
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Early in December, after a discussion with General von Krafft, I came to the conclusion that nothing further was to be gained by continuing the operation beyond the Piave. We therefore suggested to General von Arz that he should order it to stop, and arrange for the German troops to be transported to the West.
The operation against Italy had achieved all that could possibly be expected of it. The Italian Army was thoroughly beaten and needed the support of its Allies. Both the Austro-Hun- garian Army and the Western Front had been relieved. Austria- Hungary and her army had taken on a new lease of life. As Russia now concluded an armistice the Dual Monarchy appeared to be coming round to a more warlike frame of mind again. We were no longer told, as we used to be, that her army would have to drop out of the war at the beginning of winter. This campaign had once more revealed its poor fighting capacity. It badly needed the approaching period of rest for recuperation and training. Success had stimulated it.
German leadership and German troops had gained fresh laurels, and given further proofs of their superiority in the war of movement. On occasions our full force had not been developed owing to incidents arising from the lack of experience of young troops.
After the outburst of activity in September another period of quiet set in on the Macedonian Front, which was to last for some considerable time. General von Scholtz was untiring in his efforts to train the Bulgarian troops and keep them fit for battle. All German commands in Macedonia were working for the same end. The Bulgarian General Staff, however, as before, took no interest in these important questions.
In the meantime the Entente had not slackened in their en- deavours to secure the services of the Royal Greek Army. King Constantine had been deposed, and his son Alexander had suc- ceeded him. Venizelos ruled the country. The Greek Army
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had been mobilized, but the formation of troops fit for the battle- line proceeded only slowly.
In Palestine and Mesopotamia Turkish affairs became steadily worse.
Operations against Bagdad were to begin in the autumn of 1917 or the spring of 1918. A start had been made with the preparations, but in spite of the improvement in the traffic, which resulted from the opening of the tunnels, little progress was made. The service remained bad and irregular. The local commanders, however, believed that with the assistance given them by our General Staff, they would be able to overcome all these difficulties. In this they displayed too much confidence in the Turks.
The strategical basis of the enterprise against Bagdad was the security of the front in Palestine. I continually drew Enver's attention to this point and very often requested him to reinforce that front and pay particular attention to improving the service on the Syrian railways. G.H.Q. gave him all the help they could. What we gave him was not excessive, and this fell into the hands of incompetent Turks.
Colonel von Kresz was the leading spirit in all endeavours to improve the condition of the Turkish Armies in Palestine. As I afterwards discovered, he had a better idea of the troubles and anxieties of the local Headquarters than the gentlemen in Con- stantinople. The latter had far too optimistic an idea of the situation, and communicated it to their General Staff.
The authorities in Constantinople gradually came round to the idea of strengthening the Palestine Front, but now thought of achieving that object by an offensive. The operation against Bagdad was ingloriously consigned to the waste paper basket, and an attack in Palestine substituted for it. The Army Group Headquarters of von Falkenhayn was brought to this theatre.
In view of the poor' communications and the condition of the Turkish troops Colonel von Kresz had doubted the possibility of their taking the offensive, and events proved that he was right. Instead of the Turks, the English attacked.
After the failure of their attack on Gaza in March, the Colonel
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had attempted to operate against their communications in the Sinai Peninsula by means of raids and aircraft. He did once succeed in damaging their pipe-line, but he was unable to do cither it or the railway any serious harm.
REFERENCE
Turkish line at be- ginning of Eng- lish attacks.
Turkish line on 23/11/17.
Turkish line on 15/12/17.
English attacks.
1:2000000.
7 f
Fig. 28. Palestine.
At the end of August large masses of English cavalry advanced on Beersheba so as to work round the left flank of the Gaza Front and reach the water-supply of Jerusalem. This enter- prise failed, as did others on the 2nd and 18th October. Not till the 2nd November did the English succeed in capturing Beer-
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sheba. Simultaneously, with the assistance of the fleet, they attacked Gaza. The Turkish Army was forced to retire and was drawn up on the line Jaffa-Hebron-Dead Sea in order to protect Jerusalem. The English Army followed slowly. On the 17th it took Jaffa and deployed strong forces towards Jerusalem as well. On this line the Turks did not fight it out, but fell back to a position south of Nablus, between the sea and the Jordan. English troops occupied Jerusalem on the 9th December. The Turkish Army had suffered heavy losses. Its ability to offer further resistance could only be considered slight. However, the German Asiatic Corps arrived in Palestine by degrees and gave our ally some stiffening.
The defeat of the Turks greatly influenced the attitude of the Arabs who sided more and more with England.
After occupying Bagdad the English extended the area under their control further up the Euphrates and Tigris. In October they held the line Ramadieh-Samara, and in November they gained more ground towards Mosul.
On both fronts, in Palestine as in Mesopotamia, the strength of the Turks had considerably decreased. It was evident that the position there could only be maintained by means of further reinforcements.
The Russo-Turkish Front continued inactive. At my request, Enver was going to send reinforcements from there to Mesopo- tamia ; but whether the